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French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent 
employees.  Privatized  companies  must  reserve  board  seats  for  directors  elected  by  employees  by  right  of 
employment,  while  employee-shareholders  can  elect  a  director  whenever  they  hold  at  least  3%  of  outstanding 
shares. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 
2008,  we  examine  the  impact  of  employee-directors  on  corporate  valuation,  payout  policy,  and  internal  board 
organization and performance. We find that directors elected by employee shareholders increase firm valuation and 
profitability,  but  do  not  significantly  impact  corporate  payout  policy.  Directors  elected  by  employees  by  right 
significantly  reduce  payout  ratios,  but  do  not  impact  firm  value  or  profitability.  Employee  representation  on 
corporate boards thus appears to be at least value-neutral, and perhaps value-enhancing in the case of directors 
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French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to 
represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees 
by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at least 3% 
of outstanding shares. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises 
(SBF)  120  Index  from  1998  to  2008,  we  examine  the  impact  of  employee-directors  on  corporate 
valuation, payout policy, and internal board organization and performance. We find that directors elected 
by  employee  shareholders  increase  firm  valuation  and  profitability,  but  do  not  significantly  impact 
corporate payout policy. Directors elected by employees by right significantly reduce payout ratios, but do 
not impact firm value or profitability. Employee representation on corporate boards thus appears to be at 
least  value-neutral,  and  perhaps  value-enhancing  in  the  case  of  directors  elected  by  employee 
shareholders. 
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Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies 
 
1.  Introduction 
Should  employees  be  allocated  control  rights  in  the  companies  for  which  they  work?  This 
question has long been debated, but has picked up impetus recently as societies have struggled to balance 
worker rights with effective corporate governance. While the collapse of communism has removed the 
most extreme examples of employee ownership, Germany and other countries mandate that workers be 
represented on corporate boards, and most western democracies encourage employee share ownership 
through tax, compensation, and pension policies. However, it is still unclear whether employee ownership 
or representation on the corporate board of directors increases firm value or productivity. This study 
exploits a natural experiment in mandated employee representation conducted in France--a major western 
country with both a market economy and a long tradition of robust worker employment protection—to 
determine whether giving workers control rights without cost to them creates value, and whether directors 
elected by employees who are also shareholders have a differential impact on firm value than do directors 
elected by workers as a right of employment.  
Employing a sample of French companies provides a unique institutional setting for empirical 
analysis. French law mandates that employees of large publicly listed companies be allowed to elect 
directors for two reasons. First, privatized companies must reserve two or three (depending on board size) 
board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment. Since privatized firms are easily 
the largest and most valuable companies in France, this requirement induces significant representation on 
the boards of an important and highly visible group of companies by directors elected by workers who are 
not also shareholders. Second, employee-shareholders in any publicly listed firm have the legal right to 
elect one director whenever they hold at least 3% of outstanding shares. Additionally, French law allows 
but  does  not  mandate  that  listed  firms  may  adopt  a  two-tiered  supervisory  and  management  board 
structure,  as  per  the  German  model.  Taken  together,  these  regulations  and  governance  options  have 
engendered employee representation on the boards of over one-fifth of the largest French companies, but 
have  also  created  significant  cross-sectional  variation  in  the  extent  and  type  of  employee  board 
representation. Examining large French companies also allows us to study whether varying levels of 
employee  representation  impacts  firm  value  and  performance  differentially  than  does  the  fixed 
representation mandated by Germany and, most importantly, whether employee representatives elected by 
right act and impact firm policy differently than do representatives elected by employee-shareholders and 
by shareholders who do not work for the company. Our sample further allows us to directly test whether 











































employee-shareholders act like other employees or act instead as value-maximizing shareholders who 
recognize the need for the firm to pay an adequate cash return to its investors.  
Finally,  our  sample  enables  us  to  examine  how  the  differing  types  of  employee  board 
representation impact the size and meeting frequency of corporate boards. Since privatized companies or 
those that acquired a privatized firm are required to offer board representation to employees as a right, 
there is no presumption that these directors‘ positions would be created absent a legal mandate. Thus, 
firms which must offer these seats should have larger boards than do otherwise similar, non-privatized 
companies  that  are  allowed  to  set  board  size  in  a  value-maximizing  manner.  Additionally,  directors 
elected by employees by right are union representatives who are paid their normal wage for attending 
board meetings, but must pass on the union the directors‘ fees they receive. This fact alone should make 
directors elected by right relatively more eager to attend board meetings than are directors elected by 
shareholders,  since  their  opportunity  cost  of  time  is  lower,  and  this  tendency  will  be  accentuated  if 
directors elected by right see board meetings as a means to lobby managers for higher pay or other 
employee conditions.  
Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index 
from 1998 to 2008, we study the financial impact of the two types of employee representation. We find 
that directors elected by employee shareholders significantly increase firm valuation and profitability, but 
do  not  significantly  impact  corporate  payout  (dividends  and  share  repurchases)  policy  or  board 
organization  and  performance.  This  value-enhancing  effect  of  employee-shareholder  representation 
remains  after  adjusting  for  endogeneity,  after  excluding  privatized  firms  from  the  sample,  and  after 
performing  numerous  other  robustness  checks.  Directors  elected  by  employees  by  right  significantly 
reduce  payout  ratios,  and  increase  board  size,  complexity,  and  meeting  frequency—but  do  not 
significantly  impact  firm  value  or  profitability.  These  representatives  are  usually  observed  only  in 
privatized companies or in companies that acquired privatized firms in the recent past, so an important 
question is whether our key finding of reduced payouts resulting from elected employee representation on 
the board of directors is simply a residual from examining privatized companies. We perform multiple 
robustness checks and verify that elected employee representation reduces payout even when we control 
for former state owned firms, when we use firm fixed-effect regressions, and when we instrument for 
employee representation using two-stage least squares. We also find that companies with directors elected 
by right by employees have larger boards than do other companies and these boards meet significantly 
more frequently. On balance, employee representation on corporate boards seems to be at least value-
neutral, and may actually increase firm valuation and profitability when employee-shareholders elect 











































This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature on employee ownership and 
corporate board representation, while section 3 describes the French institutional background and the laws 
mandating  different  types  of  employee  representation.  Section  4  describes  our  sample  and  presents 
univariate  analyses  of  the  impact  of  the  two  types  of  employee  board  representation  on  corporate 
valuation,  financial  policies,  and  internal  board  organization  and  performance.  Section  5  presents 
regression analyses of these effects, while section 6 presents robustness checks, adjusts for endogeneity, 
and discusses the implications of the study‘s key findings. Section 7 concludes.   
 
2.  Theoretical motivation and hypotheses development 
In this section, we discuss the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of employee 
ownership and representation on firm value and financial decisions. 
 
2.1.   Employee participation in governance and firm value 
 It  is  not  clear  whether  employee  participation  in  corporate  governance  should  increase  or 
decrease firm value. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) show that, when there is perfect information, control 
rights should optimally be entrusted in one agent, the firm‘s owner. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show 
that agency problems arise whenever there is a separation of ownership and control and that institutional 
arrangements arise to ameliorate these costs. Fama and Jensen (1983a) examine the governance problems 
that arise when ownership and control are separated, as occurs naturally in most large companies, and 
describe  the  optimal  allocation  of  control  rights  to  residual  claimants  when  this  occurs  (Fama  and 
Jensen,1983b). These theoretical works suggest that the limited-liability public corporation--with nearly 
complete separation between professional managers and risk-bearing shareholders, who can feely trade 
their shares on public stock markets—probably has greater survival value in complex modern economies 
than does any competing organizational form.   
The theoretical antithesis of the public corporation is a company owned and operated by workers, 
and  there  is  a  substantial  stream  of  research  examining  whether  labor  managed  firms  can  ever  be 
competitive. The most influential early analysis of labor managed firms was presented in Jensen and 
Meckling (1979), who described the organizational, contracting, and commitment problems they predict 
must naturally arise when labor is made the owner/manager of corporate assets. These authors also make 
the insightful observation that the best evidence against the viability of labor managed firms is that these 
are never observed except where mandated by law—and even where mandated Jensen and Meckling 
assert that corporations expend great time and energy trying to escape the strictures imposed by this 











































On the other hand, a better case can be made for a hybrid form of corporate governance, where 
shareholders are accorded dominant control rights over a corporation, but where employees and other 
stakeholders are given a direct and meaningful choice. Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2007) predict that 
such  stakeholder-oriented  firms,  which  are  concerned  with  employees  and  suppliers  in  addition  to 
shareholders, will often prosper in competition with purely shareholder-oriented firms, though they also 
predict  that  the  cost  to  consumers  from  such  less-than-purely  competitive  behavior  may  be  high. 
Claessens and Ueda (2008) present empirical evidence supporting this prediction, though Lee, Liu, and 
Zhu (2008) show that employees suffer financially from over-investing in their employers‘ stocks. 
 
2.1.1.   Expected benefits from employee participation in corporate governance 
Economic theorists have posited three principal reasons why direct employee participation in 
corporate governance can be value-maximizing, and each of these predictions has garnered at least some 
empirical  support.  First,  Freeman  and  Lazear  (1995)  predict  that  having  worker  representation  on 
corporate  boards  will  allow  more  effective  information  transfer  from  board  to  workers.  Workers‘ 
representatives get precise information on the firm‘s actual situation which could make employees more 
ready to cooperate and work hard when needed.  
The second reason why worker board representation may increase value is that this promotes 
better information transfer from employees to other board members. Acharya, Myers, and Rajan (2010) 
point to the critical monitoring role that highly productive, but non-executive, employees can play in 
constraining self-serving actions by senior managers, even absent any external governance, since these 
employees bring detailed company-specific knowledge to the boardroom, and since the human capital 
they have tied up in the company gives them strong incentives to ensure that the company is managed in a 
sustainable manner.
1 
The third theoretical reason why workers should be accorded a direct say in firm governance is 
that employee representation will provide better motivation for workers and promotes convergence of 
interests between employees and shareholders. This presumes that the best way to get employees thinking 
as shareholders and working to maximize shareholders value is to let them becoming shareholders. The 
most common method of promoting employee stock ownership and participation in corporate governance 
is to encourage workers either to purchase stock directly, on their own accounts, or indirectly through 
employer-sponsored schemes. A logical corollary to this idea is that the alignment of incentives and 
                                                           
1 Raheja (2005), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), and Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2008) all predict that insider-
dominated  boards  may  have  some  competitive  advantages  over  boards  consisting  principally  of  disinterested 
outsiders, while Galai and Wiener (2008) analyze the optimal allocation of board representation for companies 












































motivational effect will be greater when employees must actually purchase shares, rather than being 
granted board seats by right. This is most comparable to the requirement in French law that employee-
shareholders must be granted board representation when their ownership exceeds a certain level. 
 
2.1.2.  Expected costs of employee participation in corporate governance 
While there is theoretical support for worker participation in corporate governance, there are also 
several theoretical and practical arguments against it. The first such argument is that granting significant 
employee  board  representation  will  saddle  the  firm  with  all  the  adverse  incentive  and  contracting 
problems associated with pure labor managed firms. This will be especially problematic if workers are 
given board seats without having to make a comparably sized financial investment—as is the case in 
French companies where workers acquire board seats by right of employment.  
The second theoretical argument against worker representation on corporate boards is that this 
will complicate firm decision making. As Jensen and Meckling (1979) predict, workers will have strong 
reason to lobby the company‘s board to grant higher pay and other rents since workers will profit from 
this at shareholders expense, but will bear few of the costs of diverting corporate cash flows. Tirole 
(2001) also shows that developing a stakeholder society—wherein a company‘s investors, employees, 
suppliers, and customers all have a say in corporate governance--is very difficult to create because of the 
dearth  of  pledgeable  income,  deadlocks  in  decision-making,  and  the  lack  of  a  clear  mission  for 
management. Employees also may favor corporate policies that reduce the likelihood of default, as they 
will loose their job in case of default. Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2009) propose a model in which 
human  capital  costs  associated  with  financial  distress  and  bankruptcy  are  large  enough  to  be  a 
disincentive to issue debt. Thus, one direct way that unions may affect firm value is by inducing managers 
to undertake less risky investments.  
Finally, granting employees board representation increases the likelihood that workers will be 
enlisted  as  an  anti-takeover  device  to  protect  entrenched  managers  from  discipline  by  shareholders. 
Pagano and Volpin (2005) model this tendency of managers to enlist workers as allies, and Bertrand and 
Mullainathan  (2003),  Atanassov  and  Kim  (2009),  and  Cronqvist,  Heyman,  Nilsson,  Svaleryd,  and 
Vlachos  (2009)  document  a  tendency  for  managers  who  are  insulated  from  takeovers—through  the 
influence,  respectively,  of  U.S.  state  business  combination  laws  and  concentrated  personal  share 
ownership of Swedish managers—to pursue the ―quiet life‖ by paying workers higher than necessary 
wages and by monitoring employees less intensively.  
 











































 Most  empirical  analyses  of  the  impact  of  mandated  employee  participation  in  corporate 
governance focus on the German system of codetermination. Germany‘s system is described and analyzed 
in Furubotn and Wiggins (1984), Levine and Tyson (1990), Freeman and Lazear (1995), and Allen and 
Gale (2002),  while  Fauver  and  Fuerst  (2006)  show  that the  system  of  Mitbestimmungrecht (right of 
codetermination)  requires  that  workers  receive  one-half  of  all  seats  on  the  supervisory  board 
(Aufsichgtrat)  of  German  Aktiengesellschaft  (AG),  or  publicly  traded  companies.  A  separate  law 
mandates that workers receive one-third of board seats in companies with between 500 and 2000 workers, 
and various supplemental regulations have narrowed the scope for German companies to escape these 
codetermination  strictures.  Fauver  and  Fuerst  (2006)  present  the  most  compelling  empirical  study 
supporting  the  proposition  that  codetermination  may  actually  create  value  by  conferring  first-hand 
operational knowledge to corporate decision-making. Using a comprehensive sample of listed German 
companies in 2003, they document that 51% have employee representation. While the median level of 
representation is one-third of board seats, over one-third of companies with representation show higher 
levels  than  legally  required.  Fauver  and  Fuerst  show  that  firms  with  employee  representation  are 
consistently more profitable and are significantly more likely to pay out cash as a dividend than are 
companies without worker representation. They also find that Tobin‘s Q is significantly higher for firms 
with greater employee representation in industries that demand high levels of coordination—principally 
industries with complex supply chains.
2 
The evidence on employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) also suggests that allowing workers to 
buy shares in their employers increases firm value. Tax laws, particularly in the United States, encourage 
firms to adopt ESOPs on their workers‘ behalves, and most of the empirical studies examining plan 
adoptions generally find that adoptions are associated with small, but significantly positive announcement 
period abnormal returns and modest long-term operating performance improvements.
3 
On the other hand, the most comprehensi ve analysis of the impact of labor voice on American 
public companies, by Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck (2006), shows that worker representation has a dark 
                                                           
2 On the other hand, several other studies that describe the workings of Germany‘s codetermination system and 
empirically analyze the German model reach conclusions similar to those foreshadowed by the Jensen and Meckling 
(1979)  analysis  of  labor  managed  firms.  Gorton  and  Schmid  (2004)  examine  German  companies  with  equal 
representation  by  employees  and  shareholders,  and  find  that  these  companies  trade  at  a  31%  market  discount 
compared  to  companies  where  employee  representatives  fill  only  one-third  of  the  supervisory  board  seats. 
Interestingly, Fauver and Fuerst (2006) also find diminishing returns to employee representation over the level of 
one-third of board seats, though they conclude greater representation still creates value.  
3 Event study tests that document positive announcement period returns around ESOP adoption include Chang 
(1990), Faria, Trahan, and Rogers (1993), and Beatty (1995 ), while Gordon and Pound (1990) find insignificant 
announcement period returns. Studies examining the taxation and accounting implications of ESOP adoption include 
Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990), Scholes and Wolfson (1990), Beatty (1995), and most recently , Kim and Ouimet 
(2009), who document that firms adopting small (less than 5% of outstanding shares) ESOPs experience a 











































side. They compare the valuation and financial performance of a sample of 255 ―labor voice firms,‖ in 
which  employee  ownership  exceeds  5%  (and  labor  representatives,  rather  than  managers,  vote  the 
employee shares), to a control sample of companies with employee ownership of less than 5%. Compared 
to the control sample, labor voice firms have lower Tobin‘s Q, invest less in long-term assets, take fewer 
risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, and exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity. 
Chen, Kacperczyk and Ortiz-Molina (2010) also document two negative effects from allowing employees 
to have a voice in corporate policies. First, they find that firms in more unionized industries spend a 
smaller fraction of their investment budgets on risky R&D than they do on physical assets. Second, they 
show that firms in more unionized industries have statistically lower bond yields, even after controlling 
for characteristics that are known to affect yields, due to unions influence on corporate affairs that serves 
as a mechanism that protects bondholders‘ wealth.  
Based  on  the  theoretical  arguments  and  empirical  evidence  discussed  above,  we  make  the 
following two predictions about the relationship between employee board representation and firm value: 
H1: Board representation by directors elected by employee-shareholders should have a positive impact 
on firm value. 
H2:  Board  representation  by  directors  elected  by  employees  as  a  right  of  employment  (without 
purchasing shares) should have a non-positive impact on firm value. 
 
2.2. Employee participation in governance and payout policy 
Compared  to  the  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  examining  the  relationship  between 
employee  ownership/representation  and  firm  value,  very  little  research  has  examined  how  worker 
ownership/representation will affect corporate payout policies. The most straightforward prediction for 
labor  managed  firms—and  for  privatized  French  companies  where employees  are  allowed to elect a 
significant fraction of a firm‘s directors by right of employment—comes from Jensen and Meckling 
(1979). They argue that worker representatives will lobby to retain corporate profits, rather than pay out 
the cash as dividends and share repurchases, since this increases the asset cushion backing labor‘s claim 
on the firm‘s cash flows. As dividends and, especially, repurchases financed through debt issues increase 
the risk of the firm (and potentially leverage), employees should prefer lower payouts. 
The  empirical  evidence  examining  the  relationship  between  employee  representation  and 
corporate payout is sparse. Using data from the restructuring of the U.S. steel industry during the 1980s, 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1991) show that dividend cuts enable firms to obtain concessions from unions 
by convincing them that shareholders themselves are forced to make sacrifices to alleviate the firm‘s 
financial difficulties. In their study of Germany‘s Codetermination system, Fauver and Fuerst (2006) find 











































Based  on  the  theoretical  arguments  and  empirical  evidence  discussed  above,  we  make  the 
following two predictions about the relationship between employee board representation and corporate 
payout policy: 
H3: Board representation by directors elected by employee-shareholders should have a non-negative 
impact on corporate payouts through dividends and share repurchases. 
H4:  Board  representation  by  directors  elected  by  employees  as  a  right  of  employment  (without 
purchasing shares) should have a negative impact on corporate payouts through dividends and 
share repurchases. 
 
3.   French law and employee representation on corporate boards 
Though  partly  inspired  by  Germany‘s  codetermination  model,  the  French  employee 
representation system was launched three decades later and has evolved quite differently. The first such 
piece of legislation was the July 23, 1983 Law, passed by a left-wing government, which allowed worker 
representation on the board of directors of state-controlled companies (where the state owns more than 
50% of the share capital).  Depending on the total number of workers, employee-selected directors can 
represent up to one third of the members of the board. Three years later, the Ordonnance 21 Octobre 
1986 allowed privately owned firms to change their statutes to have employees elected on the board.
4 To 
date, however, this option has never been adopte d by any large publicly traded company that was not 
once state-owned.  
The Law of July 25, 1994 mandated that the statutes of the company being privatized should be 
modified before sale to reserve a certain number of seats on the board of directors for the representatives 
of employees. The specific required reservations were: (1) two seats for the representatives of the labour 
force as a whole and one seat for the shareholder employees if the board of directors is made up of less 
than 15 members; and (2) three seats for the representatives of the labour force as a whole and one for the 
shareholder employees if the board of directors consists of more than 15 members. However, once the 
company was privatized, shareholders could again change the firm‘s statutes to cancel the reserved seats 
for employee representatives on the board. This same law obliges companies, in which employees hold at 
least 5% of the capital, to submit to a vote of the general meeting a resolution giving one or more seats to 
directors  representing  employees  (in  addition  to  elected  employees  on  the  board),  though  the  other 
                                                           
4 The ordonnance specifically states that ―The number of these directors cannot be higher than five, nor exceed one 
third of the number of the other directors. When the number of the directors elected by the employees is equal or 
higher than two, the ‗engineers and managers‘ have at least one seat.‖ The directors elected by the employees are not 
taken into account for the determination of the minimal number and the maximum number directors envisaged in 











































shareholders could agree or disagree. The Law of February 19, 2001 reduces the previous threshold of 
5% to 3%. 
The Law of January 17, 2002 went further, mandating that an employee director had to be 
nominated when employee ownership exceeds 3%, not just that such a proposal had to be submitted for a 
vote at the general meeting. However, the companies whose board of directors already includes one or 
more directors who are members of the board of the employees‘ mutual funds or one or more employees 
elected are not obliged to nominate another employee representative. 
As we show later, this law truly seems to have promoted board representation for employee-
shareholders, as the fraction of companies with such directors increases sharply after 2001. In many 
companies (such as Alcatel, Vivendi, and Total), it is the president of the employee mutual fund who sits 
on the board. On the other hand, this law did not by itself prompt universal compliance, as implementing 
decrees and regulations were not immediately passed. Several CEOs were reluctant to nominate new 
directors  representing  employee-shareholders,  in  particular  in  cases  where  employees  were  already 
represented  on  the  board  by  directors  elected  by  employees  as  a  right.  For  example,  shareholder-
employees of Société Générale are not represented on the board, even though they hold 7% of the capital 
and 12% of the voting rights. This suggests that managers are generally unwilling to promote increased 
employee  board  representation  unless  compelled  by  law to  do  so,  especially when  there  are already 
directors elected (by right) to represent workers. We should also point out that both types of directors 
elected by employees (those elected by right and those elected by employee shareholders) have the same 
voting and other rights and responsibilities as do all other directors.   
Privately owned firms (those that were never state-owned) can choose to have elected employees 
as directors, but never do. Most companies with employee ownership of at least 3% have nominated a 
shareholder employee director. Privatized firms sold before 1993 that are no longer state owned face 
requirements similar to the ones that private companies face. Firms privatized after 1994 were obliged at 
the date of privatization to have two or three elected employees on the board, depending on the size of the 
board, plus one shareholder employee, but they could change their statutes whenever they wanted after 
being  privatized.  Finally,  several  privatized  companies  deleted  one  or  both  classes  of  employee 
representatives when they merged with other firms.
5   
Few  companies  exp licitly  voted  to  delete  employee  representation  by  non -shareholding 
employees in isolation (not as a result of merger or recapitalization). One company that did was Saint 
Gobain, which had two elected employees on the board until 1998. It proposed to the 1999 extraordinary 
                                                           
5 As examples, employee directorships on the board of Elf Aquitaine were not taken onto the board of Total when 
these  two  companies  merged.  The  same  occurred  when  Pechiney  was  purchased  by  Alcan  or  when  Aventis 
(including formerly state-owned Rhône Poulenc) was bought by Sanofi. In fact, about one-third of all formerly state-











































general meeting (two-thirds majority required) to cancel the requirement to have elected employees on the 
board. Shareholders agreed and from 1999 Saint-Gobain had no more employee-elected directors. The 
document submitted to vote explicitly said ―ending the transitory period that began with privatization, we 
propose to…‖ Even with the deletions resulting from mergers and explicit votes, however, we will show 
that employee representation is far higher in formerly state-owned companies than in those that have 
always been private, and significantly higher in recently privatized companies than in those divested 
before 1994.  
 
4.  Data and univariate results 
The sample of firms is drawn from the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index and 
includes 201 unique firms covering 1,638 firm-years over the period 1998-2008. The SBF 120 Index 
regroups the 120 largest companies by market capitalisation and by trading volumes on Euronext Paris. 
Overall, 300 firm-year observations (18.3% of the sample) have employee directors on their boards, 184 
firm-year  observations  (11.2%  of  the  sample)  have  directors  elected  from  among  the  employee-
shareholders, and 172 (10.5%) have directors elected by right by employees—so 56 firm-years (3.4%) 
have both types of employee representatives on their boards. 
Figure 1 shows the time trend of the percent of SBF 120 firms with employee directors and the 
percent of employee directors (PEMPEMPLOYEE for the total proportion, PEMP for the employees 
elected by right and PEMPSHARE for the shareholder employees) on boards from 1998 to 2008. Panels 
A and B report that while the percent of directors elected by right by employees on corporate boards 
remains quite stable over the study period, there is a continuous increase in the fraction of firms with 
employee-shareholder directors and in the fraction of all board seats they command—and these trends 
accelerate after 2001.
6 This observation reflects the direct impact of the  Law of February 19, 2001 and 
the Law of January 17, 2002 and perhaps also mirrors the emergence of better governance practices, 
such  as  the  introduction  of  more  outside directors  on  corporate  boards  of directors,  and  the  general 
promotion of employee ownership in companies. For example, Euronext and the Fédération Française des 
Associations  d‘Actionnaires  Salariés  et  d‘Anciens  Salariés  (FAS)  launched  the  first  employee 
shareholding index in the world in December 2006. This index is composed of all SBF 250 stocks having 
                                                           
6 The variations in PEMP and PEMPSHARE have several sources: some privatized firms have dropped their elected 
employees by right (e.g. Saint-Gobain in 1999, Thomson in 2008), Other privatized firms have reduced the number 
of elected employees (e.g. France Telecom in 2004, Société Générale in 2006). In some cases, PEMP varies due to a 
variation in the size of the board (e.g. Aventis in 2002, Suez in 2004).  Similarly, the proportion of shareholder 
employee directors vary due to new nominations (e.g. Total in 2004 and Sagem in 2006) or to reduction of the 











































a significant percentage of employee shareholding—defined as at least 3% of the company‘s stocks being 
owned by more than one-fourth of its employees.
7  
**** Insert Figure 1 about here *** 
The largest company with directors elected by right by employees is BNP Paribas; these directors 
account for  13% of its  board in  2008. The  largest company  to  have  directors  elected  by  employee-
shareholders is the insurer AXA, which in 2006 has a board where such directors account for 7% of all 
seats. The company which has the highest fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the 
board is Air France in 2000 with a fraction of 35%. Finally, the company with the highest fraction of 
directors elected by employee-shareholders is Essilor International, with 27% in 2003. 
Data on corporate boards is extracted from registration documents available on the Autorité des 
Marchés Financiers (AMF) website, on the Thomson One Banker database, or on the Internet websites of 
individual  companies.  In  some  cases  we  use  ―Rapports  de  contrôle  interne  et  de  gouvernement 
d’entreprise,” which are available on the AMF website. 
Information  displayed  in  registration  documents  or  in  annual  reports  is  not  always  accurate, 
especially for years before 2001. After that year, new regulations forced companies to publish more 
details  on  the  composition  of  their  boards.  Several  databases  have  been  used  to  fill  in  missing 
biographical information of directors (such as gender, age, nationality, academic background), including 
―Who‘s Who,‖ ―Guide des Etats-Majors des Grandes Entreprises,‖ and press issues available from the 
Factiva and LexisNexis databases and other Internet sites. We decide whether directors are insiders or 
independent  using  the  criteria  presented  by  Viénot  (1995,  1999)  and  Bouton  (2002),  who  define 
independent  directors  as  directors  who  ―do  not  have  any  links  with  the  company,  its  group  or 
management liable to affect their unbiased judgement.‖ 
Economic and financial data have been collected from the Worldscope database. Other sources of 
information or databases have been used in some cases, such as registration documents and annual reports 
and the Diane and Stockproinfo databases. For most of our multivariate tests, we follow La Porta, et al. 
(2000) and Faccio, et al. (2001), and exclude firms with negative net income, negative cash flow and 
firms whose dividends exceed net income, sales and cash flow. 
We present detailed definitions of the firm, ownership, and board variables used in our tests and 
regressions in the Appendix. 
 
 
                                                           
7 See http://www.euronext.com/trader/charts/chartsAnalyses-2834-EN-FR0003999598.html?selectedMep=1. During 
the period covered by our study, this index out-performed its main comparators (the SBF 250 and CAC 40 indices), 











































4.1.  Industrial breakdown of sample firms 
Table 1 describes the industrial breakdown of the firms that are included in the SBF 120 over 
1998-2008. Manufacturing accounts for easily the largest fraction (36.6%) of all firm-year observations, 
while  agriculture,  mining,  and  construction  account  for  the  smallest  (6.23%).  Business  and  personal 
services represent almost one-fifth (18.6%) of all observations, while wholesale and retail trade, finance, 
and the transportation, communications and utilities sectors account for 10.7%, 13.8%, and 14.1% of all 
observations, respectively. 
**** Insert Table 1 about here **** 
  We should note again that privatized firms are extremely important in France, and 366 of all firm-
year observations (22.34%) are of fully or partially privatized companies or firms that acquired at least 
one  major  formerly  state  owned  firm.  These  are  heavily  over-represented  among  the  very  largest 
companies in the SBF every year and for the entire 1998-2008 study period. 55.46% (203 of 366) of these 
firm-year observations are for companies that were privatized less than ten years before the observation 
year, while the remaining 44.54% (163 observations) are for companies privatized more than ten years 
previously. There were several privatizations during our sample period: Credit Lyonnais and Air France 
in 1999, Autoroutes du Sud de la France in 2002, Autoroutes Paris Rhin Rhône and Snecma in 2004, Gaz 
de France and Electricité de France in 2005 and Aéroports de Paris in 2006. The French state owns an 
average (median) 20.85% (2.03%) of the stock of companies that were privatized recently, while the state 
owns only an average (median) 7.14% (0%) of the companies privatized more than 10 years previously. 
1,272 firm-year observations are for companies that were never state-owned, though the French state still 
owns an average 1.10% (0%) of the stock of these firms.
8 State ownership declines monotonically with 
time after the initial privatization sale. 
 
4.2.   Univariate analyses 
As a first look at how firms with employee directors differ from other large French companies, 
we  perform  univariate  comparisons. These  are  presented in Table  2. The  first  four  columns  of  data 
compare mean and median values for firms, with and without any types of employee-directors, while the 
next four columns present comparisons of firms with and without employee-directors elected by right, 
and the last four columns present firms with and without directors elected by employee-shareholders. 
Univariate tests are reported for the test for equality of means (Student-t test) and the test for equality of 
medians (Wilcoxon test) between firms having directors elected from among the employees or from 
among the employee-shareholders, and firms which don‘t have these characteristics.  
                                                           
8 The French state actually owns these stakes through the CDC, or Caisse des dépôts et consignation, which is a 











































**** Insert Table 2 about here **** 
Firms  with  all types  of  employee-directors  are  highly  significantly  larger  than  those  without 
(average €136.0 billion compared to €14.1 billion, median €24.6 billion compared to €1.9 billion), and 
firms with directors elected by employees by right are the largest of all (average €190.0 billion, median 
€29.8 billion). This is unsurprising, since these tend to be recently privatized companies or companies that 
bought privatized firms. The average (median) book-value leverage ratio for the entire sample is 25.82% 
(24.28%), and there is no significant difference in leverage ratios between any groups based on whether 
or not they have employee directors. Firms without employee directors have significantly higher tangible 
asset  ratios  than  all  categories  of  firms  with  employee-directors.  They  also  have  higher  capital 
expenditure ratios. Tobin‘s Q and MTB are significantly lower for firms with employee directors (both) 
compared  to  firms  without.  Companies  without  employee  representation  on  boards  also  grow 
significantly  more  rapidly  than  do those  with employee  directors. There are generally  no  significant 
differences  between  firms  with  and  without  employee  directors  with  respect  to  mean  payout  ratios 
(PAYOUT), although median payout is higher for firms with elected directors compared to firms without. 
On  the  other  hand,  firms  with  employee  directors  are  significantly  older  than  firms  without  such 
representation  and  have  significantly  larger  boards  that  meet  significantly  more  frequently  and  have 
significantly more standing committees. These observations are directly linked to the large size of the 
firms.
9  
The  average  size  of  corporate  boards  without  employee  representation  is  9.8  directors, 
significantly smaller than the 15.2, 16.0, and 14.7 member boards of companies  with any type of 
employee-directors, those with directors elected by right, and those with directors elected by employee -
shareholders,  respectively.  Further,  boards  with  directors  elected  by  the  employees  have  fewer 
independent directors (35% versus 43%),  whereas firms with employee -shareholder directors do not 
differ from firms without.  The median fraction of women directors is higher in firms with directors 
elected by right and in firms with directors elected by employee -shareholders than in companies without 
employee directors. The boards of firms without employee directors meet an average of 7.0 times per year 
and have an average of 1.9 standing committees, while companies with employee directors meet on 
average 7.8 times per year and have a mean 2.9 st anding committees. The mean and median values for 
both number of meetings and number of committees are significantly larger for firms with directors 
elected  by  right  compared  to  companies  with  directors  elected  by  employee -shareholders.  Thus, 
                                                           
9 Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) suggest that, other things equal, smaller boards 
are generally better, though Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) show that the actual relationship between board size 












































companies with board members representing employees have significantly larger, more complex, and 
more active boards than do companies without employee representatives.  
As noted above, French corporate law allows firms to select a two-tiered board, and we find 
significant differences between firms with and without employee board representation for both variables. 
Companies without employee representation are, on average, 2.5 times more likely to have a two-tiered 
board than are firms with employee directors, with 32% of the former having supervisory boards versus 
13% in the latter. Firms with employee and employee-shareholder directors on their boards have greater 
state  ownership  than  their  counterparts.  However,  family  ownership  is  lower  in  these  firms.  Results 
remain  robust  when  we  use  voting  rights  (both  in  univariate  and  multivariate  tests)  rather  than 
shareholdings.
10 
In sum, these univariate comparisons suggest that, compared to companies without employee 
board representation, firms with employee-directors are larger, older, less profitable, have more intangible 
and fewer tangible assets, have larger and more complex boards that meet more frequently, and are less 
likely to have a two-tiered board structure. Furthermore, the univariate analyses reveal little difference in 
observed financial policies between companies with directors elected by employees as a matter of right 
and companies with directors elected by employee -shareholders. Naturally, univariate comparisons can 
only tell us so much, so we now employ regression analyses to examine the impact of employee directors 
on corporate valuation and financial policies.  
 
5.  Methodology and regression results 
Our  multivariate  analyses  consist  of  a  series  of  regressions,  with  which  we  examine  how 
employee representation impacts corporate valuation, payout policy, and board of director performance. 
We measure valuation using two ratios, Tobin‘s Q (QTOBIN) and return on assets (ROA). Payout is 
measured variously as cash dividend payments divided by net income (PAYOUT), share repurchases 
divided by net income (REP/NETINC), and the combined value of cash dividends and share repurchases 
divided by net income (CREP/NETINC), market value (CREP/MV) and cash flows (CREP/CF). We 
report all measures but focus our comments on total payout divided by net income (CREP/NETINC). We 
next discuss the effect of employee directors on the annual frequency of board of director meetings 
(MEETINGS). On the one hand, an increased number of meetings may enhance monitoring and lead to 
better  performance.  For  example,  Vafeas  (1999)  finds  that  years  with  an  abnormally  high  meeting 
frequency are followed by improvements in operating performance. On the other hand, board meetings 
                                                           
10 All our tests are done with direct cash flow rights. We verified that they remain similar with direct voting rights, 
which allows us to account for ―double voting rights,‖ the main device used by French firms to dissociate voting 
rights and cash flow rights. This involves allowing shareholders who own stock for more than two years to double 











































are inherently costly in terms of management time and attention, the direct financial and staff resources 
committed to meetings and the potential distraction of firm efforts from value creation to consensus 
building. If there are sharply divergent interests represented on the board—as can easily be envisaged 
between profit-oriented shareholder representatives and ideologically motivated union representatives, or 
between  founding-family  representatives  and  professional  managers—the  costs  of  frequent  board 
meetings might well be significant.  
 
5.1.  The impact of employee board representation on firm value 
  Table 3 presents the results of estimating the impact of employee ownership on firm valuation 
and  profitability.  We  perform  both  ordinary  least  square  regressions  and  firm  fixed-effect  panel 
regressions  to  control  for  unobserved,  firm-specific  characteristics  such  as  strength  of  governance, 
corporate culture and managerial preferences and abilities. Columns 2-4 of Table 3 present estimations of 
Tobin‘s Q, while columns 5-10 present estimations of ROA, calculated both as operating income divided 
by assets—which is the European standard definition of ROA and the one referenced by French managers 
and investors—and as net income divided by assets, which is the standard U.S. definition. Consistent with 
extant literature, both of these measures are significantly negatively related to firm size, suggesting that 
smaller companies have higher valuations and are more profitable. Also unsurprisingly, Tobin‘s Q and 
ROA are significantly positively related to the level of capital investment spending divided by total assets 
and both are also negatively linked to the level of tangible assets as a fraction of total assets. Tobin‘s Q 
(but not ROA) is positively related to volatility. 
**** Insert Table 3 about here **** 
  Turning to the ownership structure and employee representation variables, we see that the fraction 
of directors elected by right by employees (PEMP) is significantly positively related to ROA, but only for 
some specifications, while the fraction of directors elected by employee-shareholders (PEMPSHARE) is 
significantly positively related to Tobin‘s Q and to both ROA measures, for OLS (and this result is robust 
to inclusion of a privatization dummy) and fixed-effect regressions. Employee ownership is significantly 
positively related to Tobin‘s Q for small values (EO lower than 3%) and negatively related to Tobin‘s Q 
and ROA for large values (EO higher than 10%), suggesting that small employee ownership increases 
value for shareholders but rising employee stock ownership reduces value, independent of whether this 
ownership is also reflected in board representation. Taken together, these results suggest that low levels of 











































as employee ownership increases.
11 For low levels of employee ownership, there is more motivation for 
employees and their board representatives to bring inside information to the board, which is positive for 
monitoring managers. At high levels of employee ownership employee directors bring inside information, 
but  employees  also  have  more  power  and  may  seek  large  private  benefits  (higher  wages),  thus 
counterbalancing the positive monitoring effect.
12 
  The separate effects of family and state ownership on firm value and profitability contrast 
sharply. Residual state ownership is insignificantly negatively related to Tobin‘s Q and is significantly 
negatively related to ROA in some specifications. Family ownership has a significantly positive (at the 
5% significance level) impact on both Tobin‘s Q and ROA, but these results are not robust in fixed effects 
regressions, suggesting that they mainly capture other unobserved characteristics.  
To summarize these results, we find that Tobin‘s Q is significantly higher for smaller firms with 
fewer  tangible  assets  that  spend  more  on  capital  investment  and  which  have  directors  elected  by 
employee-shareholders. Tobin‘s Q is lower for companies with high levels (≥10%) of employee share 
ownership. ROA is higher in smaller companies and in firms with high family ownership. High employee 
and state ownership both reduce ROA. ROA is higher where employee-shareholders elect one or more 
directors. This effect is economically significant. On average, PEMPSHARE is 10% for those firms with 
directors representing employee-shareholders, and the coefficient of PEMPSHARE is between 0.1162 
and  0.1720  for  regressions  examining  ROA  (using  operating  income),  so  the  marginal  impact  is 
comprised between 0.0116 and 0.0172 (an increase of 1.16% to 1.72% of the ROA), or a 10% increase in 
ROA. Finally, the fact that the adjusted R
2 is at least 0.14 in all regressions suggests that our estimation 
models are explaining a substantial fraction of the cross-sectional variation in valuation and profitability 
measures in this sample.  
 
5.2.  The impact of employee board representation on payout policy 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating the impact of employee ownership on corporate payout 
policy. Columns 2-4 of Table 4 present estimations of cash dividend payments as a percent of net income 
(PAYOUT),  columns  5-7  present  similar  findings  for  repurchases  as  a  percent  of  net  income 
(REP/NETINC), and columns 8-10 present these findings for combined dividends and repurchases as a 
percent of net income (CREP/NETINC). Columns 11 to 16 present combined dividends and repurchases 
                                                           
11  Fauver and Fuerst (2006) document a similar non-linear relationship between firm value and the fraction of 
employee board representation (not ownership), though they find that the positive impact of employee representation 
tails at a much higher level of implied influence—only after employee board representation exceeds 33.3%. 
12 These findings are confirmed when we replace (in unreported results) the proportion of the board accounted for by 
employee directors with a dummy equal to one if a given kind of employee representative is on the board. As 
robustness checks, we also introduced EO and EO² in place of EO<3 and EO≥10, and our results remained similar, 











































divided  by  cash  flows  (CREP/CF)  and  market  value  (CREP/MV),  respectively.  For  each  dependent 
variable, the first column presents OLS regressions without privatization dummy, the second column 
includes a privatization dummy to test for a specific, separate effect of employee directors that abstracts 
from the mere fact that the company was privatized, and the third one presents fixed-effect regressions. 
We perform firm fixed-effect regressions to control for unobserved factors that might impart a spurious 
correlation between annual PEMP values for a firm and its payout policies. 
 
**** Insert Table 4 about here **** 
Results  for  cash  dividend  estimations  show  both  similarities  and  differences  with  existing 
empirical research. Consistent with prior research, we find that PAYOUT is strongly negatively related to 
firm growth and risk (measured by volatility over the previous year) and positively related to firm size. 
Additionally, PAYOUT is significantly negatively related to capital spending. On the other hand, ROA is 
not significantly related to PAYOUT in most regressions.  
Columns 5-7 of Table 4 present results for estimating payout as share repurchases divided by net 
income (REP/NETINC). Consistent with existing literature [see Skinner (2008) for U.S. and von Eije and 
Megginson (2008) for European evidence] share repurchases are significantly positively related to firm 
size and, but only significantly so in fixed effects regressions, to profitability (ROA). Family ownership is 
significantly (at the 5% level) negatively related to dividend payout and unsignificantly related to share 
repurchases, while state ownership has no significant effect in most regressions. Columns 8-12 presents 
estimations where payout is defined as the combined level of cash dividend payments as a percent of net 
income (CREP/NETINC), market value (CREP/MV) and cash flow (CREP/CF).
  13 Combined payout 
measures are significantly positively related to size (in almost all regressions), positively related to ROA 
(not significant in all regressions) and negatively related to volatility.   
The  impact  of  increasing  board  representation  by  employee-directors  on  payout  variables  is 
striking  and  highly  informative.  The  fraction  of  directors  elected  by  employees  by  right  (PEMP)  is 
significantly  negatively  related  to  PAYOUT  (cash  dividends)  in  the  first  column  OLS  regression. 
However, when including PRIV (a dummy equal to one when the firm was once state owned), or using 
fixed effect regressions, PEMP is no longer significant, meaning that the effect on payout is mainly due to 
the fact that the firm was previously state owned or to other unknown factors. However, when share 
repurchases are taken into account, either alone (column 5-7) or combined with cash dividends (column 
8-16),  the  fraction  of  elected  employee-directors  has  a  significantly  negative  impact.  These  findings 
                                                           
13 All these regressions have also been performed replacing PEMP and PEMPSHARE by dummies DEMP and 
DEMPSHARE, equal to one if the firm has elected employees or shareholder employee on the board, respectively. 











































highlight that elected employee-directors have a significant ability to discourage firms repurchasing their 
own shares and reducing the total amount of cash distributed to shareholders, since the reduction in share 
repurchases is not offset by any increase in dividend payments. Conversely, the presence of directors 
elected by employee-shareholders (PEMPSHARE) has no significant effect on dividend payout or share 
repurchases. These results suggest that directors who represent workers who are not also shareholders 
work to reduce the amount of cash distributed by the firm to outside shareholders, whereas directors 
representing employee-shareholders act in the interest of all shareholders and do not reduce payouts.  
Taken  together,  these  results  show  that  both  ownership  structure  and  board  representation 
materially and significantly influence corporate payout policies. The presence of directors elected by 
employees as a right (PEMP) always has a significantly negative impact on share repurchases. This effect 
is economically significant. The average value of PEMP for those companies that have employee-elected 
directors is 20% and the coefficient for total payout (dividends and repurchases) in the regressions are 
comprised between 0.30 and 0.70 depending on the specification. Thus, the marginal impact is about a 
0.06 to 0.14 (6% to 14%) decrease in the amount of cash that is distributed to shareholders of firms with 
PEMP. This is consistent with employees who are not also owners acting to block cash distributions from 
firms that would benefit shareholders. On the other hand, directors representing employee-shareholders 
generally  do  not  significantly  impact  corporate  payout  policies,  and  instead  seem  to  have  the  same 
interests as directors representing outside shareholders.  
Clearly, both of the relationships involving employee representatives on corporate boards and 
observed  financial  policies  and  outcomes  (PEMPSHARE-value  and  PEMP-payout  relationships)  are 
economically as well as statistically significant. 
 
5.3.  The impact of employee board representation on board meeting frequency 
We estimate the impact of employee representation on corporate board performance in two ways. 
First,  we  test  whether  worker  representation  on  the  board  leads  on  average  to  more  frequent  board 
meetings. Second, we estimate the likelihood that directors will be elected by employees as a right and by 
employee-shareholders based on observable firm characteristics.  
Table 5 presents the results of estimating average board meeting frequency, using a Poisson 
regression to explain the number of meetings. As discussed in Greene (2003), an OLS regression model is 
not  suitable  for  a  discrete-censored  variable  like  MEETINGS  as  it  provides  biased  and  inconsistent 
estimations, so we use Poisson regressions instead. Many of the findings are fairly intuitive. For example, 
it is unsurprising that boards of companies that are larger and more risky as measured by volatility will 
meet significantly more frequently on average than will less complex boards of less risky firms, or that 











































financially troubled firms. Greater complexity in the task of overseeing a company implies the need to 
assemble as a board more frequently to assess and adjust firm objectives, while the need to make such 
adjustments is less urgent when the current corporate plan is working—when profits are high.  
**** Insert Table 5 about here **** 
We find that board members elected by employees as a right are associated with significantly 
more frequent board meetings than are board members who represent shareholders, either employee-
shareholders or outside shareholders. The coefficient on the continuous variable measuring the fraction of 
the board accounted for by workers (PEMP) is significantly positive in four out of six specifications. 
Directors elected by workers who are also shareholders do not increase the number of meetings. If we 
consider the number of meetings as a proxy for more monitoring, boards with elected employees will 
better  control  the  CEO.  These  employees  may  reduce  managerial  discretion,  as  they  have  specific 
information on the firm that they may share with other directors. On the other hand, the larger number of 
meetings may also result from increased bargaining on wages and other employment characteristics. In 
that case, giving employees the right to elect a fraction of the board of directors may impose additional 
costs on the firm. These results are robust to the inclusion of PRIV (privatization dummy), meaning that 
the increased number of meetings is not due to the fact that the firm is a former state owned firm. 
However,  PEMP  is  no  longer  significant  when  fixed  effect  regressions  are  run,  meaning  that  other 
unknown factors may explain the increased number of meetings. 
We also estimate the fraction of a corporate board that will be elected by employees. (We do not 
tabulate these results here, but they are available upon request.) Since the dependent variable is truncated 
at zero, Tobit regression is used to explain PEMP and PEMPSHARE. Both types of employee board 
representation are likely to be smaller when employee share ownership is positive but lower than 3% 
(EO<3). High state ownership (STATE) and the company being a privatized firm or having acquired a 
privatized firm (PRIV) are the other main determinants of elected employee representation. The rationale 
for the STATE and PRIV results are fairly obvious, since we know that employee representation is 
common  in  privatized  companies.  Further,  elected  employee  representation  is  higher  for  large,  low 
growth firms and for one-tier board firms.  For shareholder employee representation, we find that EO 
equal to or greater than 10% increases board representation, which is also higher in companies with a one-
tier board. This suggests that employee representation is a result of political and legal forces, especially 
the amount of stock retained in privatized companies by the state and employees‘ own share ownership. 
Though political influences matter for both types of representation, the election of directors representing 
employees who are not also shareholders seems to be driven by more explicitly political factors and is 












































6.  Robustness checks and discussion  
6.1.  Testing for endogeneity in financial policy choice   
The  univariate  and  regression  results  presented  above  present  a  clear  message  that  board 
representation granted to shareholder employees tends to be value-enhancing and unrelated to payout 
policies, generally supporting our hypotheses H1 and H3, while board representation by directors elected 
by employees by right tends to be value neutral but reduces payout, supporting hypotheses H2 and H4.  
Before accepting these findings as conclusive, however, we must subject them to robustness checks. In 
particular, there could be endogeneity in the choice of financial policies, especially payout policy, since 
PEMP is observed only in firms that were privatized or acquired a privatized companies—and is not 
always observed even in those firms, since some have eliminated employee directors elected by right. Our 
results in Table 3 and 4, testing for robustness when including PRIV and using fixed effects alleviate the 
concern that there is a spurious correlation between PEMP and the fact that the firms are formerly stage 
owned. Another possible source of endogeneity is the potential for reverse causality in the relationship 
between  board  representation  by  directors  elected  by  employee-shareholders  (PEMPSHARE)  and 
valuation.  We  predict  that  employee-shareholder  representation  leads  to  superior  performance  and 
valuation, but it also possible that more profitable and valuable firms would attract greater employee 
ownership and more employees on the board.  
We examine further both possible sources of endogeneity in this section. We investigate the 
PEMP-payout and PEMPSHARE-valuation relationships by employing a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression.  We instrument PEMP with the industry mean, the average fraction of directors elected among 
the employees in the firm‘s industry. We test this instrumental variable for its relevance (correlated with 
the endogenous variable PEMP) and validity (uncorrelated with the standard errors). We then instrument 
PEMPSHARE with industry mean PEMPSHARE. Again, this variable has the characteristics of relevant 
instrumental variables: they are correlated with the endogenous variable PEMPSHARE, yet uncorrelated 
with the standard errors. We find that these instruments yield highly significant predictions of the actual 
values of PEMP and PEMPSHARE. 
The second stage results using industry median PEMP and industry median PEMPSHARE to 
instrument PEMP and PEMPSHARE, respectively, are presented in Table 6. Results for payout policy 
estimations are generally similar to the original unadjusted findings. As before, the fraction of directors 
elected by employees by right (PEMP) is significantly negatively related to all our measures of dividend 
policy (at the 5% or 1% levels). On the other hand, PEMPSHARE now has a consistently positive effect 
on payout, and this is significant for three of the five payout measures. These results suggest that directors 
who represent workers who are not also shareholders work to reduce the amount of cash distributed by 











































counterforce to increase dividends and repurchases. Most of the other explanatory variables have similar 
coefficient signs and significance levels, after adjusting for endogeneity, as in the original unadjusted 
regression analysis. All our payout policy variables are significantly negatively related to firm volatility 
and to capital spending, and are positively related to size. Family ownership (FAM) has a consistent and 
usually significant negative impact on payouts, while state ownership (STATE) is significantly positively 
related to all but one payout measure. 
**** Insert Table 6 about here **** 
The  results of estimating  the impact  of  employee  ownership  on  performance,  controlling  for 
endogeneity, are also similar to the OLS findings for most variables. We find a strong and significantly 
positive effect of PEMPSHARE on all three performance measures (Tobin‘s Q and ROA computed using 
net income and operating income). Though PEMP is not significantly related to Tobin‘s Q or ROA using 
net income, it is significantly negatively related (at the 10% level) to ROA measured as operating income 
divided by assets. We confirm that family ownership and low levels of employee ownership (<3%) are 
positively  related  to  value  and  performance,  while  high  levels  of  employee  ownership  (≥10%)  are 
significantly  negatively  related.  CAPEX  remains  significantly  positively,  and  TANGIBLE  remains 
significantly negatively related to all three performance and valuation measures.  
 
6.2.  Privatized firms that eliminated PEMP representation 
If board representation by directors elected by employees by right do in fact reduce corporate 
payouts, then a straightforward prediction is that privatized companies should begin increasing payouts 
once  these  directors‘  positions  are  eliminated.  We  test  this  proposition  by  including  in  the  OLS 
regressions a new variable ELIMINATION that takes a value of 1 after a company eliminates directors 
elected by employees by right. There are six such firms and, as shown in Table 7, these do begin to 
significantly increase payouts after PEMP board representation ends. This is perhaps the single strongest 
and most clearcut evidence we can find indicating that it is employee board representation (PEMP) that 
depresses corporate payouts, and not simply the fact that a firm was privatized. 
**** Insert Table 7 about here **** 
 
6.3.  Other robustness checks of the PEMP-payout relationships 
  This section describes the results of  four additional robustness tests performed to verify that 
PEMP has a separate negative effect on corporate payouts, over and above the fact that a company was 
once state owned. The methodology and results of these tests are briefly discussed below, but in the 











































Since the binary privatized/not-privatized variable (PRIV) freezes a company‘s identity for all 
time, we include the number of years since privatization (NB_YEARS_PRIV) as an additional variable to 
measure how much a company in, say, 2006 may have evolved away from its industrial configuration and 
ownership structure in the year it was first privatized (say 1999). The NB_YEARS_PRIV variable has a 
significant negative sign in most of our payout regressions, but even with this new variable included 
PEMP remains significantly negative in almost all the payout analyses.  
As a related test, we also exclude recently privatized companies--those divested less than 10 years 
previously—to examine only companies that have operated under private ownership long enough to cease 
being ―privatized firms‖ in any meaningful sense. PEMP remains significantly negatively related to all 
five payout measures when recently privatized firms are excluded, and in fact the significance levels on 
the PEMP coefficients all increase substantially.  
In order to tease out whether direct state control of a firm subsumes the separate effect of PEMP 
on payout, we include a dummy variable taking a value of 1 whenever the French state retains at least a 
blocking  minority  shareholding  (33.33%  in  French  law)  in  a  partially  privatized  company.  In  these 
companies the state is itself still wielding significant direct influence on firm policies, and thus PEMP 
should have little or no incremental explanatory power. Even in these cases, however, PEMP retains a 
significant negative influence on all five measures of payout.  
Rather than treat all privatizations as a single explanatory variable, we break specific sales into 
five privatization waves based on the government in power at the time that a particular privatizing share 
sale was launched. This allows each of the five waves—representing sales by the Chirac (1986-88), 
Balladur  (1993-95),  Juppé  (1995-97),  Jospin  (1997-2002),  and  Raffarin-Villepin  (2002-2007) 
governments—to  have  a  separate  effect,  as  might  be  the  case  if  different  waves  embodied  different 
proscriptions for post-sale corporate governance. Our basic finding of a separate, significant, negative 
relationship  between  PEMP  and  all  five  measures  of  payout  remains  even  after  including  separate 
privatization wave dummy variables.  
 
6.4.  Further investigations of PEMPSHARE/value relationship 
We address the potential for reverse causality between PEMPSHARE and value in section 6.1 
above. We use a 2SLS instrumental variables approach where PEMPSHARE is instrumented using the 
industry median PEMPSHARE. A strong positive relationship is verified between employee-shareholder 
board representation and Tobin‘s Q, ROA computed using operating income, and ROA computed using 
net income.    
Another potential concern is that employee representation could be strongly correlated with other 











































robustness  test,  we  examine  whether  the  presence  of  a  major  blockholder  (the  State)  influences  the 
relationship between PEMPSHARE and firm performance. Specifically, we include a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 whenever the French state retains at least a blocking minority shareholding (33.33% in 
French  law)  in  a  partially  privatized  company.  In  these  companies  the  state  is  itself  still  wielding 
significant  direct  influence  on  firm  policies.  Even  after  controlling  for  this,  however,  PEMPSHARE 
remains positively and significantly related to valuation as measured by Tobin‘s Q and ROA. We also 
perform the same analysis with a dummy variable FAM taking a value of 1 when a founding family 
retains at least a blocking  minority in a company,  and the PEMPSHARE-value relationship remains 
significantly  positive.  Since  the  State  and  founding  families  are  by  far  the  two  most  important 
blockholders in large French companies, this suggests that modest levels of PEMPSHARE cause superior 
performance, even in presence of large shareholders as monitors. In the interest of space, we do not 
present a tabulation of these results, but these are available upon request.  
As a final robustness check, we analyze the potential impact that having outsiders on a firm‘s 
board  might  have  on  firm  performance  and  on  PEMPSHARE‘s  influence.  Including  such  a 
POUTSIDERs variable for the fraction of the board represented by unaffiliated outsiders (not employees, 
managers, state, or founding family) in our regressions does not alter the significant, positive relationship 
between  PEMPSHARE  and  valuation  (Tobin‘s  Q  and  ROA).  Interestingly,  POUTSIDERS  has  a 
significant negative impact on Tobin‘s Q and a significant positive impact on all measures of payout, 
while other ownership structure variables (family shareholdings, state ownership, proxies for different 
measures of employee shareholdings, and PEMP) all have the same relationship with performance. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 8.  
**** Insert Table 8 about here **** 
While  the  robustness  tests  described  above  do  not  absolutely  disprove  that  there  is  reverse 
causality in the relationship between PEMPSHARE and firm value and performance, we believe that the 
weight of evidence implies that increasing employee-shareholder board representation leads to higher 
valuation and better performance, rather than the other way round.  
 
6.5.   Generalizability of our results 
Clearly, the French employee ownership regime examined in this study is unique, and thus we 
cannot  directly  prove  that  our  results  are  generalizeable  to  corporate  governance  settings  in  other 
countries. On the other hand, we believe our results are in fact generalizeable, at least to other advanced 
economies, for several reasons. First, the French companies that form our core sample of firms with both 
types of employee board representation are all large, highly visible companies that have operated in 











































European  and  North  American  countries,  so  the  industrial  and  financial  forces  impacting  French 
companies (particularly privatized companies) will have direct analogs throughout the developed world.   
A second, related factor supporting the generalizeability of our results is the shares of most of the 
large privatized French companies are cross-listed on U.S. and/or European stock markets. In fact, non-
French institutional investors (mostly U.S. and U.K.) own over half of the stock of privatized French 
firms,  as  well  as  sizeable  fractions  of  the  largest  non-privatized  firms.  Thus,  these  companies  are 
operating in a truly global corporate governance market, and it is hard to imagine that these companies 
would retain shareholder-employee directors if these did not yield a true performance benefit. 
Third, our findings of a positive impact of employee board representation on firm performance 
are generally consistent with the recent empirical evidence from Germany‘s codetermination system. This 
is  especially  true  for  the  Fauver  and  Fuerst  (2006)  study,  since  they  also  show  that  employee 
representation does not penalize firm valuation—though we offer unique additional evidence of how 
different types of employee representation impact corporate payout policies.  
Finally, our results are also consistent with the empirical evidence from other developed countries 
showing that increasing employee share ownership is associated with increasing firm value. In particular, 
empirical studies examining how the adoption of employee stock ownership (ESOP) by U.S. companies 
almost all document a positive relationship between ESOP adoption and improved firm performance. 
Although very few U.S. companies have employee board representatives on their boards—and those that 
do generally have directors imposed by unions—there is consistent empirical support for the proposition 
that rising voluntary employee share ownership increases value. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
This  study  examines  the  impact  of  mandated  employee  board  representation  on  corporate 
valuation and performance. French law mandates that employees of large publicly listed companies be 
allowed to elect directors for two reasons, by right of employment in formerly state-owned companies and 
when their shareholdings exceed three percent. These two rights have engendered substantial employee 
representation  on  the  boards  of  over  one-quarter  of  the  largest  French  companies,  and  especially  in 
privatized companies or firms that acquired a privatized firm that are the country‘s largest and most 
valuable.  This  provides  a  unique  institutional  setting  in  which  to  test  whether  and  how  employee 
representation impacts firm value, profitability, payout policies (cash dividends and repurchases), and 
board organization, complexity, and performance. We generate predictions based on received theory and 
test these predictions using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 











































We find that the presence of directors elected by employees by right significantly reduces payout 
ratios, increases overall staff costs, and increases board size, complexity, and meeting frequency—but 
does  not  significantly  impact  firm  value  or  profitability.  This  result  suggests  there  must  be  some 
significant  benefit  resulting  from  board  representation  by  non-shareholder  employee  that  offsets  the 
unequivocal facts that these directors reduce cash payouts to shareholders, increase board complexity, and 
have no obvious community of interests with outside investors. We also document that directors elected 
by employee-shareholders significantly increase firm valuation and profitability but do not significantly 
impact corporate payout policy or board organization and performance. This suggests that the directors 
elected by employee-shareholders act like any other type of elected director, rather than specifically as 
employee representatives. 
Since many corporate policies, especially those related to payout, may result endogenously rather 
than as a direct result of employee representation on corporate boards, we perform numerous robustness 
checks that verify the negative causal link between representation of employees by right and all types of 
corporate payouts. On balance, employee representation on corporate boards seems to be at least value-
neutral, and may actually increase firm valuation and profitability when employee-shareholders elect 
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Figure 1 - Board structure trends: 1998-2008 
The sample consists of all the SBF 120 Index firms over the period 1998-2008. Panel A reports the percent of firms 
with employee directors (directors elected from among the employees or the employee-shareholders). Panel B reports 
the percent of employee directors (directors elected from among the employees or the employee-shareholders) on 
boards of firms  with employee representation.  DEMPLOYEES is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has 
employee directors on the board, and zero otherwise. DEMP is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has directors 
elected from among the employees on the board, and zero otherwise. DEMPSHARE is a dummy variable equal to one 
if  the  firm  has  directors  elected  from  among  the  employee-shareholders  on  the  board,  and  zero  otherwise. 
PEMPLOYEES is the fraction of directors elected from among the employee directors on the board. PEMP is the 
fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board. PEMPSHARE is the fraction of directors elected 






































































Table 1 - Composition of the sample by industry (one-digit SIC code) 
This table reports the composition of the sample by industry - one-digit SIC code. The sample consists of all the SBF 120 Index firms over the period 1998-2008. 
 
Industries  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  Total 
Agriculture, mining, construction  11  11  10  10  8  8  8  9  9  9  9  102 
8.80%  7.80%  6.41%  6.06%  5.10%  5.30%  5.26%  5.96%  5.96%  6.08%  6.38%  6.23% 
Manufacturing  50  54  55  57  57  54  54  53  56  56  53  599 
40.00%  38.30%  35.26%  34.55%  36.31%  35.76%  35.53%  35.10%  37.09%  37.84%  37.59%  36.57% 
Transportation, communications, 
utilities 
11  13  19  22  23  23  24  25  26  24  21  231 
8.80%  9.22%  12.18%  13.33%  14.65%  15.23%  15.79%  16.56%  17.22%  16.22%  14.89%  14.10% 
Wholesale and retail trade  14  15  19  22  18  17  17  15  13  13  12  175 
11.20%  10.64%  12.18%  13.33%  11.46%  11.26%  11.18%  9.93%  8.61%  8.78%  8.51%  10.68% 
Finance, insurance, real estate  17  23  23  23  22  20  20  20  20  19  19  226 
13.60%  16.31%  14.74%  13.94%  14.01%  13.25%  13.16%  13.25%  13.25%  12.84%  13.48%  13.80% 
Business and personal services  22  25  30  31  29  29  29  29  27  27  27  305 
17.60%  17.73%  19.23%  18.79%  18.47%  19.21%  19.08%  19.21%  17.88%  18.24%  19.15%  18.62% 
Total  125  141  156  165  157  151  152  151  151  148  141  1,638 












































Table 2 - Descriptive statistics of variables over the period 1998-2008 
This table presents summary statistics on key firm, ownership and board variables and tests of differences in means (Student test) and medians (Wilcoxon test) 
between different types of firms. The sample consists of all the SBF 120 Index firms over the period 1998-2008. SIZE is the book value of total assets in euro 
millions.  LEVERAGE  is  measured  as  total  debt  over  total  assets.  TANGIBLE  is  the  ratio  of  tangible  assets  to  total  assets.  CAPEX  is  the  ratio  of  capital 
expenditures to total assets. ROA is the return on assets measured as operating income over total assets. QTOBIN is the Tobin‘s Q defined as the market value of 
equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets. MTB is the market-to-
book ratio measured as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book value of total liabilities, all divided by the book value of total assets. 
GROWTH is the growth rate computed as percentage change in net sales between years N-1 and N. VOLAT is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns 
over the fiscal year immediately preceding the proxy date. STAFFCOSTS represents wages paid to employees and officers of the company divided by the number 
of employees. PAYOUT is constructed as a ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to net income. DIV/CF is the ratio of total 
cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to cash flow. YIELD is the ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to 
market capitalization. REP/NETINC is the ratio of share repurchase amounts to net income. REP/CF is the ratio of share repurchase amounts to cash flow. 
REP/MV  is  the  ratio  of  share  repurchase  amounts  to  market  capitalization.  CREP/NETINC  is  the  ratio  of  cash  dividends  paid  to  common  and  preferred 
shareholders and share repurchase amounts to net income. CREP/CF is the ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders plus share 
repurchase amounts to cash flow. CREP/MV is the ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders plus share repurchase amounts to 
market capitalization. CREATION is the firm age in years. BOARDSIZE is the number of directors on the board. PWOMEN is the fraction of women on the board. 
POUTSIDERS is the fraction of independent directors on the board, using the criteria presented by Viénot (1995, 1999) and Bouton (2002). MEETINGS is the 
annual number of board meetings (it excludes actions by written consent of the directors and telephonic meetings of the board). COMMITTEES is the total 
number of standing board committees. SUPERVISORY is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a dual structure (Conseil de surveillance and Directoire), 
and zero if the firm has a unique board of directors (Conseil d’administration). EO is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total 
shares outstanding. FAM is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the founding families to total shares outstanding. STATE is the ratio of the 
number of shares of all classes held by the French state to total shares outstanding. N is the number of non-missing observations in the sample. ***, **, * indicate 
coefficients significance level: 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 











































Table 2 - Continued 
Variables  N 
Firms with employee 
directors 
Firms without employee 
directors 
Firms with directors 
elected by right 
Firms without directors 
elected by right 
Firms with directors elected 
by employee-shareholders 
Firms without directors elected 
by employee-shareholders 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
SIZE  1,638  136,000.00  24,558.51  14,133.76***  1,869.44***  190,000.00  29,755.51  17,792.81***  2,164.80***  60,598.32  22,920.40  30,812.94***  2,106.50*** 
LEVERAGE  1,638  0.264  0.223  0.262  0.245  0.276  0.226  0.261  0.241  0.257  0.234  0.263  0.240 
TANGIBLE  1,638  0.179  0.110  0.253***  0.177***  0.173  0.094  0.248***  0.172***  0.180  0.113  0.248***  0.172*** 
CAPEX  1,638  0.037  0.034  0.077  0.042***  0.035  0.028  0.074  0.042***  0.040  0.039  0.074  0.041** 
ROA  1,638  0.047  0.029  0.047  0.055***  0.045  0.025  0.047  0.054***  0.044  0.035  0.047  0.054*** 
QTOBIN  1,638  1.449  1.168  1.944**  1.380***  1.499  1.107  1.897  1.360***  1.335  1.179  1.920**  1.362*** 
MTB  1,638  0.897  0.674  1.572***  1.042***  0.912  0.608  1.515**  1.009***  0.811  0.701  1.531***  1.014*** 
GROWTH  1,638  0.089  0.062  1.736  0.098***  0.078  0.046  1.614  0.095***  0.078  0.061  1.621  0.096*** 
VOLAT  1,614  0.092  0.080  0.101**  0.088**  0.094  0.087  0.100  0.087  0.091  0.076  0.101*  0.088** 
STAFFCOSTS  1,633  58.794  56.59  50.295***  43.985***  62.712  61.076  50.582***  44.563***  54.221  53.911  51.417  45.475*** 
PAYOUT  1,638  0.399  0.308  0.313  0.232***  0.411  0.313  0.318  0.238***  0.398  0.292  0.319  0.238** 
DIV/CF  1,638  0.233  0.148  0.191  0.133**  0.273  0.150  0.190*  0.135**  0.168  0.136  0.201  0.136 
YIELD  1,638  0.029  0.022  0.021***  0.015***  0.031  0.022  0.022***  0.016***  0.026  0.021  0.022  0.016*** 
REP/NETINC  1,638  0.052  0.000  0.069  0.000  0.026  0.000  0.071  0.000  0.074  0.000  0.065  0.000** 
REP/CF  1,638  0.035  0.000  0.056  0.000  0.025  0.000  0.056  0.000  0.041  0.000  0.054  0.000** 
REP/MV  1,626  0.005  0.000  0.006  0.000*  0.003  0.000  0.006  0.000  0.006  0.000  0.006  0.000** 
CREP/NETINC  1,637  0.451  0.351  0.449  0.268***  0.438  0.354  0.451  0.276*  0.472  0.332  0.446  0.276 
CREP/CF  1,635  0.267  0.169  0.249  0.157  0.298  0.174  0.247  0.157  0.209  0.150  0.258  0.159 
CREP/MV  1,620  0.034  0.024  0.028*  0.017***  0.034  0.023  0.028  0.018***  0.033  0.023  0.028  0.018*** 
CREATION  1,638  77.440  63.000  56.131***  39.000***  67.930  61.000  59.069**  41.000***  85.201  72.500  56.840***  40.000*** 
BOARDSIZE  1,638  15.203  15.000  9.783***  9.000***  16.035  16.000  10.158***  10.000***  14.728  15.000  10.275***  10.000*** 
PWOMEN  1,638  0.071  0.065  0.075  0.000***  0.080  0.067  0.073  0.000***  0.074  0.067  0.074  0.000*** 
POUTSIDERS  1,119  0.422  0.429  0.436  0.429  0.355  0.333  0.443***  0.429***  0.456  0.462  0.430  0.429 
MEETINGS  1,352  7.930  7.000  7.053***  6.000***  8.329  8.000  7.085***  6.000***  7.554  7.000  7.192  6.000*** 
COMMITTEES  1,636  2.907  3.000  1.932***  2.000***  2.983  3.000  2.008***  2.000***  2.848  3.000  2.017***  2.000*** 
SUPERVISORY  1,638  0.133  0.000  0.315***  0.000***  0.064  0.000  0.307***  0.000***  0.158  0.000  0.298***  0.000*** 
EO  1,638  5.010  3.500  1.177***  0.400***  3.454  3.105  1.695***  0.500***  6.232  4.090  1.329***  0.490*** 
FAM  1,638  1.047  0.000  19.885***  8.080***  0.292  0.000  18.33***  4.100***  1.473  0.000  18.330***  3.230*** 











































Table 3 - Employee directors and firm performance 
The table presents results from regressing the Tobin‘s Q (QTOBIN) defined as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the 
book value of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets and the return on assets (ROA) constructed as the 
ratio of operating income (alternatively using net income) to total assets on various firm, ownership and board characteristics. We estimate these 
variables via Ordinary Least Squares regressions and firm fixed-effect regressions. The sample consists of all the SBF 120 Index firms over the 
period 1998-2008. As in La Porta, et al. (2000) and Faccio, et al. (2001), we exclude firms with negative net income, negative cash flows and 
with dividends exceeding net income, sales, or cash flow. LSIZE is the natural log of the book value of total assets. GROWTH is the growth rate 
computed as percentage change in net sales between years N-1 and N. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. TANGIBLE is 
the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. VOLAT is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns over the fiscal year immediately 
preceding the proxy date. PEMP is the fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board. PEMPSHARE is the fraction of 
directors elected from among the employee-shareholders on the board. EO<3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of the number of 
shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding is strictly positive and less than 3%, and zero otherwise. EO≥10 is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding is higher than 
10%, and zero otherwise. FAM is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the founding families to total shares outstanding. STATE 
is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the French state to total shares outstanding. PRIV is a dummy variable that equals one 
when  the  firm  was  formerly  state-owned.  Industry  dummies  and  year  dummies  are  included.  The  table  presents  the  coefficients  and 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values and then the R² and adjusted R². N is the number of non-missing observations in the 
sample. ***, **, * indicate coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
QTOBIN  ROA (using operating income)  ROA (using net income) 
OLS  OLS 
Firm fixed- 
effects  OLS  OLS 
Firm fixed- 
effects  OLS  OLS 
Firm fixed- 
effects 
LSIZE  -0.1140**  -0.1207***  -0.2353***  -0.0102***  -0.0105***  -0.0107***  -0.0080***  -0.0083***  -0.0072*** 
   (-5.507)  (-5.644)  (-6.110)  (-9.322)  (-9.565)  (-5.604)  (-11.267)  (-10.957)  (-6.800) 
GROWTH  -0.0012***  -0.0013***  -0.0009***  -0.0001***  -0.0001***  -0.0001  0.0001***  0.0001***  0.0001*** 
   (-5.651)  (-5.673)  (-3.373)  (-5.224)  (-4.876)  (-0.733)  (16.357)  (13.292)  (14.750) 
CAPEX  2.3707***  2.3726***  3.0050***  0.0963***  0.0996***  0.0926**  0.0610**  0.0654***  0.0514** 
   (2.877)  (2.888)  (3.457)  (2.750)  (2.841)  (2.459)  (2.515)  (2.665)  (2.063) 
TANGIBLE  -0.8532***  -0.8727***  -0.5962***  -0.0283***  -0.0322***  -0.0206*  -0.0148**  -0.0195***  -0.0137* 
   (-5.937)  (-5.991)  (-2.961)  (-3.155)  (-3.666)  (-1.733)  (-2.303)  (-3.050)  (-1.731) 
VOLAT  3.7618***  3.6415***  3.4528***  -0.0230  -0.0305  -0.0380  -0.0083  -0.0161  -0.0296 
   (4.272)  (4.116)  (4.072)  (-0.547)  (-0.723)  (-1.267)  (-0.310)  (-0.610)  (-1.344) 
PEMP  0.5950  -0.0502  1.9073**  0.0406  -0.0185  0.0781*  0.0963**  0.0303  0.0828* 
   (0.910)  (-0.095)  (2.253)  (1.426)  (-0.597)  (1.813)  (2.561)  (1.176)  (1.695) 
PEMPSHARE  2.5279***  2.2605***  2.1953***  0.1376***  0.1162***  0.1720***  0.1012***  0.0779***  0.0772** 
   (3.019)  (2.641)  (2.734)  (3.455)  (3.038)  (3.184)  (4.139)  (3.165)  (2.502) 
EO<3  0.2175***  0.2132***  0.1730**  0.0026  0.0008  0.0040  0.0080**  0.0057*  0.0029 
   (3.161)  (3.238)  (2.013)  (0.571)  (0.179)  (0.870)  (2.347)  (1.761)  (0.691) 
EO≥10  -0.5678***  -0.5399***  -0.3892***  -0.0343***  -0.0346***  0.0008  -0.0214***  -0.0223***  -0.0077 
   (-4.158)  (-3.798)  (-3.048)  (-4.569)  (-4.832)  (0.073)  (-5.135)  (-5.394)  (-1.490) 
FAM  0.0038**  0.0042**  0.0034  0.0002**  0.0002**  0.0001  0.0001**  0.0001**  0.0001 
   (2.042)  (2.197)  (1.057)  (2.036)  (2.083)  (0.847)  (2.072)  (2.200)  (0.933) 
STATE  -0.0022     0.0026  -0.0004***     0.0001  -0.0005***     -0.0003* 
   (-0.725)     (0.682)  (-2.964)     (0.121)  (-4.132)     (-1.696) 
PRIV     0.1235        0.0026        0.0012    
      (1.130)        (0.434)        (0.309)    
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes    
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes    
Constant  2.4339***  2.5366***  4.6917***  0.2307***  0.2367***  0.2275***  0.1518***  0.1577***  0.1584*** 
   (6.503)  (6.623)  (7.420)  (11.126)  (11.365)  (6.962)  (10.962)  (11.27)  (8.727) 
R²  0.24  0.24  0.16  0.24  0.24  0.14  0.25  0.24  0.25 
Adjusted R²  0.22  0.22     0.22  0.22     0.23  0.22    











































Table 4 - Employee directors and dividend policy 
The table presents results from regressing the ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to net income (PAYOUT), the ratio of share 
repurchase amounts to net income (REP/NETINC), and the ratio of cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders and share repurchase amounts to 
net income (CREP/NETINC), cash flow (CREP/CF) and market capitalization (CREP/MV) on various firm, ownership and board characteristics. We estimate 
these variables via Ordinary Least Squares regressions and firm fixed-effect regressions. The sample consists of all the SBF 120 Index firms over the period 
1998-2008. As in La Porta, et al. (2000) and Faccio, et al. (2001), we exclude firms with negative net income, negative cash flows and with dividends exceeding 
net income, sales, or cash flow. LSIZE is the natural log of the book value of total assets. ROA is the return on assets measured as operating income over total 
assets. GROWTH is the growth rate computed as percentage change in net sales between years N-1 and N. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio measured as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book value of total liabilities, all divided by 
the book value of total assets. VOLAT is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns over the fiscal year immediately preceding the proxy date. PEMP is 
the fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board. PEMPSHARE is the fraction of directors elected from among the employee-shareholders 
on the board. EO<3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding is strictly 
positive and less than 3%, and zero otherwise. EO≥10 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to 
total shares outstanding is higher than 10%, and zero otherwise. FAM is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the founding families to total 
shares outstanding. STATE is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the French state to total shares outstanding. PRIV is a dummy variable that 
equals one when the firm was formerly state-owned. Industry dummies and year dummies are included. The table presents the coefficients and heteroskedasticity-
consistent (White, 1980) t-values and then the R² and adjusted R². N is the number of non-missing observations in the sample. ***, **, * indicate coefficients 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 











































Table 4 - Continued 
 
Variables 
PAYOUT  REP/NETINC  CREP/NETINC  CREP/CF  CREP/MV 
OLS  OLS 
Firm fixed- 
effects  OLS  OLS 
Firm fixed- 
effects  OLS  OLS 
Firm fixed- 
effects  OLS  OLS 
Firm fixed- 
effects  OLS  OLS 
Firm fixed- 
effects 
LSIZE  0.0071*  0.0100**  0.0134**  0.0143***  0.0170***  0.0167***  0.0214***  0.0270***  0.0317***  -0.0024  0.0011  0.0175***  0.0016***  0.0019***  0.0035*** 
   (1.695)  (2.257)  (2.125)  (2.965)  (3.370)  (2.879)  (3.328)  (3.999)  (3.851)  (-0.515)  (0.214)  (2.933)  (3.032)  (3.610)  (5.676) 
ROA  0.0175  -0.0003  -0.4690***  0.2374  0.2497  0.3053**  0.2549  0.2494  -0.0415  0.7307  0.7355*  0.7125  0.0738***  0.0750***  0.1023*** 
   (0.124)  (-0.002)  (-3.143)  (1.506)  (1.596)  (1.963)  (1.385)  (1.378)  (-0.190)  (1.645)  (1.675)  (1.393)  (2.949)  (3.041)  (4.151) 
GROWTH  -0.0002***  -0.0001***  -0.0001**  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0002***  -0.0001  -0.0001***  0.0002***  0.0003***  0.0001  0.0001***  0.0001***  0.0001*** 
   (-4.244)  (-2.708)  (-2.165)  (-0.788)  (0.619)  (-1.285)  (-3.394)  (-1.404)  (-3.044)  (4.750)  (5.680)  (0.544)  (8.078)  (8.743)  (6.283) 
CAPEX  -0.3351**  -0.3146**  0.0808  -0.2447**  -0.2444**  -0.2902**  -0.5798***  -0.5590***  -0.2497  -0.6618***  -0.6541***  -0.3810**  -0.0372***  -0.0370***  -0.0210 
   (-2.472)  (-2.339)  (0.633)  (-2.253)  (-2.255)  (-2.290)  (-3.049)  (-2.972)  (-1.266)  (-4.409)  (-4.431)  (-2.263)  (-3.222)  (-3.282)  (-1.541) 
MTB  0.0001  0.0005  -0.0001  0.0043  0.0045  -0.0007  0.0044  0.0049  -0.0010  -0.0042  -0.0039  -0.0120  -0.0037***  -0.0037***  -0.0056*** 
   (0.015)  (0.089)  (-0.035)  (0.736)  (0.767)  (-0.135)  (0.592)  (0.678)  (-0.147)  (-0.325)  (-0.306)  (-1.042)  (-4.431)  (-4.443)  (-5.695) 
VOLAT  -0.9553***  -0.9088***  -0.1505  -0.3660***  -0.3285**  -0.3898**  -1.3213***  -1.2373***  -0.6949***  -0.9372***  -0.8860***  -0.4158**  -0.0480***  -0.0437***  -0.0034 
   (-6.593)  (-6.278)  (-1.166)  (-2.579)  (-2.331)  (-2.512)  (-6.080)  (-5.745)  (-3.209)  (-5.211)  (-4.920)  (-2.452)  (-3.187)  (-2.904)  (-0.174) 
PEMP  -0.3041**  0.0201  -0.2427  -0.3960***  -0.3088***  -0.3453**  -0.7000***  -0.2887*  -0.6090***  -0.2427*  -0.0460  -0.3909**  -0.0344**  -0.0232**  -0.0496*** 
   (-2.241)  (0.174)  (-1.293)  (-3.616)  (-3.168)  (-2.545)  (-3.883)  (-1.895)  (-2.681)  (-1.798)  (-0.462)  (-2.465)  (-2.517)  (-2.359)  (-3.126) 
PEMPSHARE  0.0102  0.1464  0.1206  -0.2418*  -0.1943  -0.1560  -0.2315  -0.0479  -0.1249  -0.0262  0.0664  0.1577  -0.0244  -0.0185  -0.0237 
   (0.057)  (0.822)  (0.502)  (-1.707)  (-1.354)  (-0.864)  (-0.959)  (-0.198)  (-0.421)  (-0.118)  (0.301)  (0.541)  (-1.283)  (-0.945)  (-0.990) 
EO<3  0.0248  0.0289*  0.0005  -0.0152  -0.0227  0.0088  0.0096  0.0061  0.0114  0.0144  0.0090  -0.0005  -0.0036*  -0.0044**  -0.0027 
   (1.483)  (1.727)  (0.024)  (-0.814)  (-1.261)  (0.434)  (0.354)  (0.229)  (0.385)  (0.697)  (0.430)  (-0.019)  (-1.784)  (-2.240)  (-1.002) 
EO≥10  -0.0475  -0.0594*  -0.1141**  0.0036  -0.0145  0.0695  -0.0439  -0.0738  -0.0250  -0.0175  -0.0383  -0.0202  -0.0008  -0.0028  0.0018 
   (-1.379)  (-1.751)  (-2.559)  (0.066)  (-0.271)  (0.673)  (-0.665)  (-1.145)  (-0.223)  (-0.502)  (-1.140)  (-0.340)  (-0.166)  (-0.601)  (0.257) 
FAM  -0.0007**  -0.0009***  -0.0012**  -0.0005  -0.0006  -0.0004  -0.0011**  -0.0015***  -0.0014*  -0.0005  -0.0007*  -0.0005  -0.0001  -0.0001*  -0.0001 
   (-2.261)  (-2.842)  (-2.565)  (-1.245)  (-1.588)  (-0.751)  (-2.205)  (-2.776)  (-1.903)  (-1.324)  (-1.820)  (-0.916)  (-1.228)  (-1.654)  (-0.959) 
STATE  0.0012*     0.0011  -0.0007     -0.0004  0.0006     0.0009  -0.0002     -0.0001  -0.0001     -0.0001 
   (1.726)     (1.191)  (-1.489)     (-0.719)  (0.638)     (0.851)  (-0.239)     (-0.024)  (-1.021)     (-0.280) 
PRIV     -0.0556***        -0.0598***        -0.1153***        -0.0747***        -0.0068***    
      (-2.760)        (-2.736)        (-3.776)        (-3.806)        (-3.467)    
Industry 
Dummies  Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes    
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes    
Constant  0.2700***  0.2272***  0.1653  0.0276  -0.0059  -0.1289  0.2976**  0.2213  0.0164  0.3866***  0.3405***  0.0084  0.0361***  0.0322***  -0.0218* 
   (3.232)  (2.646)  (1.477)  (0.257)  (-0.054)  (-1.258)  (2.120)  (1.551)  (0.110)  (3.159)  (2.738)  (0.076)  (2.988)  (2.676)  (-1.868) 
R²  0.21  0.21  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.15  0.16  0.14  0.17  0.18  0.11  0.30  0.30  0.29 
Adjusted R²  0.19  0.19     0.04  0.05     0.13  0.13     0.15  0.16     0.28  0.29    











































Table 5 - Board meeting frequency and employee directors 
The  table  presents  results  from  regressing  the  number  of  annual  board  meetings  (MEETINGS)  on  various  firm,  ownership  and  board 
characteristics. We estimate the number of annual board meetings via Poisson regressions and firm fixed-effect regressions. The sample 
consists of all the SBF 120 Index firms over the period 1998-2008. LSIZE is the natural log of the book value of total assets. ROA is the 
return on assets measured as operating income over total assets. GROWTH is the growth rate computed as percentage change in net sales 
between years N-1 and N. VOLAT is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns over the fiscal year immediately preceding the proxy 
date. SUPERVISORY is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a dual structure (Conseil de surveillance and Directoire), and zero if 
the firm has a unique board of directors (Conseil d'administration). BOARDSIZE is the natural log of the number of directors on the board. 
PEMP is the fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board. PEMPSHARE is the fraction of directors elected from 
among the employee-shareholders on the board. EO<3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of the number of shares of all classes 
held by the employees to total shares outstanding is strictly positive and less than 3%, and zero otherwise. EO≥10 is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding is higher than 10%, and zero 
otherwise. FAM is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the founding families to total shares outstanding. STATE is the ratio 
of the number of shares of all classes held by the French state to total shares outstanding. PRIV is a dummy variable that equals one when the 
firm was formerly state-owned. Industry dummies and year dummies are included. The table presents the coefficients and heteroskedasticity-
consistent (White, 1980) t-values and then the R² and adjusted R². N is the number of non-missing observations in the sample. ***, **, * 




POISSON  POISSON 
Firm fixed- 
effects  POISSON  POISSON 
Firm fixed- 
effects 
LSIZE  0.0280***  0.0254***  0.0340***  0.0474***  0.0461***  0.0495*** 
   (4.033)  (3.482)  (2.872)  (5.633)  (5.267)  (3.725) 
ROA  -0.3230***  -0.3290***  -0.4232***  -0.3170***  -0.3225***  -0.4166*** 
   (-2.718)  (-2.774)  (-3.154)  (-2.591)  (-2.639)  (-3.163) 
GROWTH  0.0127  0.0124  0.0091  0.0129  0.0138*  0.0097 
   (1.567)  (1.502)  (0.887)  (1.521)  (1.675)  (0.944) 
VOLAT  2.0808***  2.0569***  0.8788***  1.8446***  1.8409***  0.8412*** 
   (7.560)  (7.432)  (4.245)  (6.808)  (6.765)  (4.071) 
SUPERVISORY           -0.1339***  -0.1247***  -0.0934** 
            (-4.481)  (-4.235)  (-2.454) 
LBOARDSIZE           -0.1747***  -0.1705***  -0.1454** 
            (-4.276)  (-4.220)  (-2.337) 
PEMP  0.5777***  0.4534**  0.0912  0.5098**  0.5509***  0.1223 
   (2.782)  (2.370)  (0.258)  (2.543)  (2.869)  (0.347) 
PEMPSHARE  0.0765  -0.0304  0.7583  0.1044  0.0903  0.7003 
   (0.181)  (-0.077)  (1.488)  (0.254)  (0.234)  (1.392) 
EO<3  -0.0031  0.0029  0.0436  -0.0019  0.0105  0.0471 
   (-0.082)  (0.078)  (0.993)  (-0.048)  (0.283)  (1.081) 
EO≥10  -0.1170**  -0.0951*  -0.0134  -0.0879*  -0.0679  0.0012 
   (-2.140)  (-1.748)  (-0.110)  (-1.679)  (-1.285)  (0.010) 
FAM  -0.0013*  -0.0011  -0.0004  -0.0014**  -0.0013*  -0.0007 
   (-1.892)  (-1.573)  (-0.420)  (-2.039)  (-1.852)  (-0.712) 
STATE  0.0003     0.0015  0.0012     0.0018 
   (0.351)     (0.988)  (1.351)     (1.164) 
PRIV     0.0576*        0.0381    
      (1.941)        (1.276)    
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes    
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes    
C  1.4599***  1.4927***  1.3390***  1.6132***  1.6103***  1.4807*** 
   (9.64)  (9.743)  (6.859)  (10.667)  (10.623)  (7.436) 
R²  0.18  0.18  0.13  0.21  0.20  0.18 
Adjusted R²  0.17  0.17     0.19  0.19    











































Table 6 - Second stage analysis of valuation and payout 
This table reports the second stage of a 2SLS regression using the average fraction of directors elected from among 
the  employees  or  the  employee-shareholders  as  instruments  for  PEMP  and  PEMPSHARE,  respectively.  The 
dependent variables are the Tobin‘s Q (QTOBIN) defined as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year 
plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets, the return on 
assets (ROA) constructed as the ratio of operating income (alternatively using net income) to total assets, the ratio of 
total  cash  dividends  paid  to  common  and  preferred  shareholders  to  net  income  (PAYOUT)  the  ratio  of  share 
repurchase  amounts  to  net  income  (REP/NETINC),  the  ratio  of  cash  dividends  paid  to  common  and  preferred 
shareholders and share repurchase amounts to net  income (CREP/NETINC), cash  flow (CREP/CF) and  market 
capitalization (CREP/MV) on various firm, ownership and board characteristics. The sample consists of all the SBF 
120 Index firms over the period 1998-2008. As in La Porta, et al. (2000) and Faccio et al. (2001), we exclude firms 
with negative net income, negative cash flows and with dividends exceeding net income, sales, or cash flow. LSIZE 
is the natural log of the book value of total assets. ROA is the return on assets measured as operating income over 
total assets. GROWTH is the growth rate computed as percentage change in net sales between years N-1 and N. 
CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio measured as the market 
value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book value of total liabilities, all divided by the book value of 
total assets. VOLAT is the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns over the fiscal year immediately preceding 
the proxy date. TANGIBLE is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. PEMP is the fraction of directors elected 
from  among  the  employees  on  the  board.  PEMPSHARE  is  the  fraction  of  directors  elected  from  among  the 
employee-shareholders on the board. EO<3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of the number of shares of 
all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding is strictly positive and less than 3%, and zero otherwise. 
EO≥10 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to 
total shares outstanding is higher than 10%, and zero otherwise. FAM is the ratio of the number of shares of all 
classes held by the founding families to total shares outstanding. STATE is the ratio of the number of shares of all 
classes held by the French state to total shares outstanding. Industry dummies and year dummies are included. The 
table presents the coefficients and heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values and then the R² and adjusted 
R². N is the number of non-missing observations in the sample. ***, **, * indicate coefficients significant at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 











































Table 6 - Continued 
 
 





net income)  PAYOUT  REP/NETINC  CREP/NETINC  CREP/CF  CREP/MV 
LSIZE  -0.1316***  -0.0112***  -0.0083***  0.0109**  0.0166***  0.0275***  0.0019  0.0019*** 
   (-5.467)  (-9.914)  (-10.928)  (2.357)  (3.161)  (3.878)  (0.378)  (3.550) 
ROA           0.0121  0.2308  0.2430  0.7333  0.0716*** 
            (0.088)  (1.430)  (1.329)  (1.634)  (2.816) 
GROWTH  -0.0014  -0.0001  0.0001**  -0.0002***  -0.0001  -0.0003***  0.0001***  0.0001*** 
   (-1.057)  (-1.147)  (2.378)  (-4.999)  (-1.287)  (-4.197)  (3.467)  (6.198) 
CAPEX  2.4086***  0.0988***  0.0630**  -0.3408***  -0.2462**  -0.5871***  -0.6681***  -0.0382*** 
   (2.983)  (2.615)  (2.459)  (-2.588)  (-2.250)  (-3.146)  (-4.528)  (-3.368) 
MTB           -0.0002  0.0040  0.0038  -0.0044  -0.0038*** 
            (-0.047)  (0.686)  (0.521)  (-0.342)  (-4.553) 
VOLAT  3.2734***  -0.0524  -0.0171  -0.9289***  -0.3527**  -1.2817***  -0.8964***  -0.0474*** 
   (3.860)  (-1.320)  (-0.634)  (-6.344)  (-2.493)  (-5.942)  (-4.974)  (-3.091) 
TANGIBLE  -0.8833***  -0.0305***  -0.0166**                
   (-4.136)  (-3.051)  (-2.448)                
PEMP  -4.9755  -0.3292*  0.0281  -2.8147***  -1.9915**  -4.8062***  -2.4786***  -0.3520*** 
   (-1.377)  (-1.946)  (0.245)  (-4.579)  (-2.368)  (-4.454)  (-3.637)  (-5.091) 
PEMPSHARE  46.8370***  2.8800***  0.9781**  4.3845**  2.1757  6.5602*  2.8822  0.6885** 
   (3.675)  (4.827)  (2.420)  (2.005)  (0.705)  (1.686)  (1.166)  (2.537) 
EO<3  0.8844***  0.0435***  0.0216***  0.0448  -0.0064  0.0384  0.0140  0.0021 
   (4.134)  (4.34)  (3.182)  (1.233)  (-0.142)  (0.634)  (0.383)  (0.490) 
EO≥10  -3.3454***  -0.2070***  -0.0742***  -0.3733***  -0.1856  -0.5589**  -0.2479  -0.0520*** 
   (-3.907)  (-5.163)  (-2.733)  (-2.646)  (-1.046)  (-2.405)  (-1.538)  (-3.233) 
FAM  0.0039**  0.0002**  0.0001**  -0.0008***  -0.0006  -0.0014***  -0.0007*  -0.0001 
   (2.311)  (2.331)  (2.395)  (-2.826)  (-1.458)  (-2.663)  (-1.723)  (-1.547) 
STATE  0.0058  0.0002  -0.0004  0.0063***  0.0025  0.0088***  0.0045***  0.0006*** 
   (0.737)  (0.434)  (-1.516)  (4.705)  (1.599)  (4.068)  (3.131)  (3.903) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  1.5711***  0.1768***  0.1309***  0.1801*  -0.0119  0.1682  0.3202**  0.0221* 
   (3.066)  (7.369)  (8.058)  (1.915)  (-0.090)  (0.998)  (2.533)  (1.675) 
R²  0.24  0.25  0.25  0.22  0.07  0.16  0.18  0.31 
Adjusted R²  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.20  0.04  0.14  0.16  0.29 













































Table 7 - Elimination of elected employee directors (PEMP) from the board 
This  table  presents  results  from  regressing  the  ratio  of  total  cash  dividends  paid  to  common  and  preferred 
shareholders to net income (PAYOUT), the ratio of share repurchase amounts to net income (REP/NETINC), the 
ratio of cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders and share repurchase amounts to net income 
(CREP/NETINC), cash flow (CREP/CF) and market capitalization (CREP/MV) on various firm, ownership and 
board characteristics. The sample consists of all the SBF 120 Index firms over the period 1999-2008 after excluding 
all non-privatized firms. As in La Porta, et al. (2000) and Faccio, et al. (2001), firms with negative net income, 
negative cash flow and firms whose dividends exceed sales are excluded. LSIZE is the natural log of the book value 
of total assets. ROA is the return on assets measured as operating income over total assets. GROWTH is the growth 
rate  computed  as  percentage  change  in  net  sales  between  years  N-1  and  N.  CAPEX  is  the  ratio  of  capital 
expenditures to total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio measured as the market value of equity at the end of the 
fiscal year plus the book value of total liabilities, all divided by the book value of total assets. VOLAT is the standard 
deviation of the monthly stock returns over the fiscal year immediately preceding the proxy date. ELIMINATION is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if elected employee directors were eliminated from the board between 
years N-1 and N, and zero otherwise. PEMP is the fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the 
board. PEMPSHARE is the fraction of directors elected from among the employee-shareholders on the board. EO<3 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total 
shares outstanding is strictly positive and less than 3%, and zero otherwise. EO≥10 is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding is higher than 
10%, and zero otherwise. FAM is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the founding families to 
total shares outstanding. STATE is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the French state to total 
shares  outstanding.  Industry  dummies  and  year  dummies  are  included.  The  table  presents  the  coefficients  and 
heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values and then the R² and adjusted R². N is the number of  non-
missing observations in the sample. ***, **, * indicate coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 











































Table 7 - Continued 
 
 
Variables  PAYOUT  REP/NETINC  CREP/NETINC  CREP/CF  CREP/MV 
LSIZE  -0.0009  0.0143**  0.0134  -0.0062  0.0026** 
   (-0.065)  (2.025)  (0.860)  (-0.772)  (1.977) 
ROA  0.0289  0.0800  0.1089  0.2198  0.0758** 
   (0.066)  (0.344)  (0.211)  (0.691)  (2.264) 
GROWTH  -0.0002*  -0.0001  -0.0003**  0.0001  0.0001*** 
   (-1.855)  (-1.182)  (-2.099)  (1.381)  (3.832) 
CAPEX  -1.1575***  -0.2019  -1.3594**  -1.1435***  -0.1170* 
   (-3.310)  (-0.541)  (-2.575)  (-3.786)  (-1.858) 
MTB  -0.0163  0.0001  -0.0162  -0.0032  -0.0041* 
   (-1.000)  (0.004)  (-0.706)  (-0.249)  (-1.901) 
VOLAT  -0.9079*  -0.1705  -1.0783**  -0.8527***  -0.0583* 
   (-1.942)  (-0.892)  (-2.030)  (-3.134)  (-1.780) 
ELIMINATION  0.1384  0.0960  0.2344**  0.2262***  0.0131* 
   (1.178)  (1.267)  (2.111)  (2.690)  (1.724) 
PEMP  -0.1045  -0.3377**  -0.4423*  -0.0064  -0.0110 
   (-0.570)  (-2.350)  (-1.838)  (-0.047)  (-0.748) 
PEMPSHARE  -0.4639  -0.6555**  -1.1195**  -0.5282  -0.0397 
   (-1.037)  (-2.230)  (-2.107)  (-1.511)  (-1.244) 
EO<3  -0.0118  -0.0614*  -0.0731  -0.0741**  -0.0044 
   (-0.308)  (-1.788)  (-1.418)  (-2.546)  (-1.536) 
EO≥10  -0.1951**  -0.0373  -0.2324**  -0.2169***  -0.0067 
   (-2.505)  (-0.963)  (-2.550)  (-3.971)  (-0.852) 
FAM  -0.0010  0.0007  -0.0003  -0.0007  0.0006 
   (-0.605)  (0.364)  (-0.109)  (-0.450)  (0.832) 
STATE  0.0013  -0.0003  0.0010  -0.0004  -0.0001 
   (1.282)  (-0.677)  (0.912)  (-0.552)  (-1.399) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  0.4540*  -0.0729  0.3811  0.4307***  0.0007 
   (1.841)  (-0.565)  (1.422)  (2.989)  (0.037) 
R²  0.26  0.24  0.29  0.45  0.44 
Adjusted R²  0.15  0.14  0.20  0.37  0.37 












































Table 8 - Fraction of outsiders 
This table presents results from regressing the Tobin‘s Q (QTOBIN) defined as the market value of equity at the end of the 
fiscal year plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets, the return on 
assets (ROA) constructed as the ratio of operating income to total assets (alternatively using net income), the ratio of total cash 
dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to net income (PAYOUT) the ratio of share repurchase amounts to net 
income (REP/NETINC), the ratio of cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders and share repurchase amounts 
to net income (CREP/NETINC), and the number of annual board meetings (MEETINGS) on various firm, ownership and 
board characteristics. We estimate these variables via Ordinary Least Squares regressions and Poisson regressions for the 
MEETINGS variable. The sample consists of all the SBF 120 Index firms over the period 1998-2008. As in La Porta, et al. 
(2000)  and  Faccio,  et  al.  (2001),  we  exclude  firms  with  negative  net  income,  negative  cash  flows  and  with  dividends 
exceeding net income, sales, or cash flow (except for the MEETINGS variable). LSIZE is the natural log of the book value of 
total  assets.  ROA  is  the  return  on  assets  measured  as  operating  income  over  total  assets.  GROWTH  is  the  growth  rate 
computed as percentage change in net sales between years N-1 and N. CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio measured as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book 
value of total liabilities, all divided by the book value of total assets. VOLAT is the standard deviation of the monthly stock 
returns over the fiscal year immediately preceding the proxy date. TANGIBLE is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. 
PEMP is the fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board. PEMPSHARE is the fraction of directors 
elected from among the employee-shareholders on the board. POUTSIDERS is the fraction of independent directors on the 
board, using the criteria presented by Viénot (1995, 1999) and Bouton (2002). EO<3 is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding is strictly positive and less than 
3%, and zero otherwise. EO≥10 is a dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the 
employees to total shares outstanding is higher than 10%, and zero otherwise. FAM is the ratio of the number of shares of all 
classes held by the founding families to total shares outstanding. STATE is the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held 
by the French state to total shares outstanding. Industry dummies and year dummies are included. The table presents the 
coefficients and heteroskedasticity-consistent (White, 1980) t-values and then the R² and adjusted R². N is the number of non-
missing observations in the sample. ***, **, * indicate coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 











































Table 8 - Continued 
 
 





net income)  PAYOUT  REP/NETINC  CREP/NETINC  MEETINGS 
LSIZE  -0.0583***  -0.0088***  -0.0066***  0.0066  0.0047  0.0113  0.0280*** 
   (-2.984)  (-7.350)  (-7.474)  (1.253)  (0.768)  (1.351)  (3.516) 
ROA           -0.1828  0.0699  -0.1128  -0.4093*** 
            (-1.008)  (0.293)  (-0.430)  (-2.749) 
GROWTH  0.0163  0.0108**  0.0079**  -0.0448**  0.0546  0.0098  0.0104 
   (0.196)  (2.122)  (2.085)  (-2.350)  (0.998)  (0.144)  (1.105) 
CAPEX  4.0246***  0.1731***  0.0742**  -0.4370**  -0.5198***  -0.9568***    
   (5.267)  (3.699)  (2.142)  (-2.224)  (-2.701)  (-3.131)    
MTB           0.0129  0.0296**  0.0425**    
            (1.487)  (2.055)  (2.407)    
VOLAT  1.7830**  -0.0818*  -0.0270  -1.1292***  -0.6299***  -1.7591***  2.0634*** 
   (2.323)  (-1.740)  (-0.775)  (-5.478)  (-2.650)  (-5.244)  (9.420) 
TANGIBLE  -0.6506***  -0.0232**  -0.0042             
   (-3.703)  (-2.160)  (-0.528)             
PEMP  -0.2086  0.0072  0.1015***  -0.3057*  -0.3617***  -0.6674***  0.4076* 
   (-0.297)  (0.167)  (3.186)  (-1.787)  (-2.657)  (-2.991)  (1.739) 
PEMPSHARE  3.0338***  0.1469***  0.1156***  -0.1016  -0.3677**  -0.4693  0.0478 
   (3.313)  (2.621)  (2.787)  (-0.498)  (-2.129)  (-1.598)  (0.129) 
POUTSIDERS  -0.4790***  -0.0122  -0.0084  0.0935**  0.1145***  0.2080***  -0.2266*** 
   (-3.243)  (-1.354)  (-1.259)  (2.504)  (2.580)  (3.330)  (-3.705) 
EO<3  0.1472  0.0005  0.0056  0.0257  -0.0333  -0.0076  -0.0221 
   (1.641)  (0.087)  (1.369)  (1.268)  (-1.432)  (-0.229)  (-0.643) 
EO≥10  -0.5196***  -0.0573***  -0.0265***  -0.0331  -0.0382  -0.0714  -0.1735** 
   (-2.764)  (-4.978)  (-3.106)  (-0.848)  (-0.544)  (-0.840)  (-2.188) 
FAM  0.0049***  0.0001  0.0001*  -0.0005  -0.0006  -0.0011  -0.0017** 
   (3.277)  (0.704)  (1.845)  (-1.229)  (-1.139)  (-1.492)  (-2.508) 
STATE  -0.002  -0.0004**  -0.0006***  0.0019**  -0.0005  0.0014  0.0415 
   (-0.698)  (-2.103)  (-4.432)  (2.297)  (-0.965)  (1.313)  (1.132) 
Industry 
dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant  2.0521***  0.2240***  0.1392***  0.2814***  0.1773  0.4587***  1.5961*** 
   (5.525)  (9.850)  (8.273)  (2.749)  (1.367)  (2.679)  (10.739) 
R²  0.26  0.27  0.24  0.21  0.07  0.14  0.19 
Adjusted R²  0.23  0.24  0.21  0.18  0.04  0.11  0.17 
N  815  815  815  815  815  815  1,024 
 











































Appendix - Description of firm, ownership structure, and board variables 
This table explains the construction of the firm, ownership and board variables used in our regressions. 
   
BOARDSIZE  Number of directors on the board. Source: Registration documents. 
CAPEX  Ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Source: Worldscope. 
COMMITTEES  Total number of standing board committees. Source: Registration documents. 
CREATION  Firm age, in years. Source: Registration documents, Diane. 
CREP/CF  Ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders plus share repurchase amounts 
to cash flow. Source: Worldscope. 
CREP/MV  Ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders plus share repurchase amounts 
to market capitalization. Source: Worldscope. 
CREP/NETINC  Ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders plus share repurchase amounts 
to net income. Source: Worldscope. 
DEMP  Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has directors elected from among the employees on the board, 
and zero otherwise. Source: Registration documents. 
DEMPLOYEES  Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has employee directors on the board, and zero otherwise. 
Source: Registration documents. 
DEMPSHARE  Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has directors elected from among the employee-shareholders on 
the board, and zero otherwise. Source: Registration documents. 
DIV/CF  Ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to cash flow. Source: 
Worldscope. 
ELIMINATION  Dummy variable equal to one if elected employee directors were eliminated from the board between 
years N-1 and N, and zero otherwise. Source: Registration documents. 
EO  Ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to total shares outstanding (excluding 
CEO ownership). Source: Registration documents. 
EO<3 
Dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to 
total shares outstanding is strictly positive and less than 3%, and zero otherwise. Source: Registration 
documents. 
EO≥10  Dummy variable equal to one if the ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the employees to 
total shares outstanding is higher than 10%, and zero otherwise. Source: Registration documents. 
FAM  Ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the founding families to total shares outstanding. 
Source: Registration documents. 
GROWTH  Growth rate computed as percentage change in net sales between years N-1 and N. Source: Worldscope. 
INDUSTRY  Primary one-digit SIC code dummies. Source: Thomson One Banker, Diane. 
LEVERAGE  Leverage measured as total debt over total assets. Source: Worldscope. 
LSIZE  Natural log of the book value of total assets. Source: Worldscope. 
MEETINGS  Annual number of board meetings (excludes actions by written consent of the directors and telephonic 
meetings of the board). Source: Registration documents. 
MTB  Market-to-book ratio measured as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book 
value of total liabilities, all divided by the book value of total assets. Source: Worldscope. 
NB_YEARS_PRIV  Number of years since the privatization of the company. Source: Registration documents. 
PAYOUT  Dividend payout ratio constructed as a ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred 
shareholders to net income. Source: Worldscope. 
PEMP  Fraction of directors elected from among the employees on the board. Source: Registration documents. 
PEMP_INDUSTRY  Average fraction of directors elected from among the employees in the firm‗s industry. Source: 
Registration documents. 
PEMPLOYEES  Fraction of employee directors on the board. Source: Registration documents. 












































PEMPSHARE_INDUSTRY  Average fraction of directors elected from among the employee-shareholders in the firm‘s industry. 
Source: Registration documents. 
POUTSIDERS  Fraction of independent directors on the board, using the criteria presented by Viénot (1995, 1999) and 
Bouton (2002). Source: Registration documents. 
PRIV  Dummy variable equal to one if the firm is of fully or partially privatized companies, and zero otherwise. 
Source: Registration documents. 
PWOMEN  Fraction of women directors on the board. Source: Registration documents. 
QTOBIN  Tobin‘s Q defined as the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year plus the book value of assets 
minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets. Source: Worldscope. 
REP/CF  Ratio of share repurchase amounts to cash flow. Source: Worldscope. 
REP/MV  Ratio of share repurchase amounts to market capitalization. Source: Worldscope. 
REP/NETINC  Ratio of share repurchase amounts to net income. Source: Worldscope. 
ROA  Return on Assets measured as operating income (alternatively using net income) over total assets. 
Source: Worldscope. 
SIZE  Book value of total assets, euro millions. Source: Worldscope. 
STAFFCOSTS  Wages paid to employees and officers of the company divided by the number of employees. Source: 
Worldscope. 
STATE  Ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the French state to total shares outstanding. Source: 
Registration documents. 
SUPERVISORY 
Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has a dual structure (Conseil de surveillance and Directoire), 
and zero if the firm has a unique board of directors (Conseil d'administration). Source: Registration 
documents. 
TANGIBLE  Ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Source: Worldscope. 
VOLAT  Standard deviation of the monthly stock returns over the fiscal year immediately preceding the proxy 
date. Source: Worldscope. 
YEAR  Year dummies. 
YIELD  Ratio of total cash dividends paid to common and preferred shareholders to market capitalization. 
Source: Worldscope. 
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